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Foreign Policy in God’s Name
Evangelical influence on U.S. policy towards Sudan
One in four Americans call themselves evangelicals, and these conservative
Protestants have been at in the center of American domestic politics for
years. 
But less well documented is their impact on U.S. foreign policy. Religious
conservatives claim they are the reason why President George W. Bush fo-
cused increasingly on foreign aid to Africa, religious persecution and hu-
man trafficking 
This study investigates in detail the case of U.S. peace-making in Sudan.
Following a brief discussion of the relationship between religion and poli-
tics in the U.S., it describes how a major grassroots coalition for Southern
Sudan was built by religious conservatives in the late 1990s, and how this
coalition persuaded President Bush to get involved in the peace process
between North and South Sudan. This involvement was pivotal in securing
the peace deal in 2005, which ended Africa's most persistent civil war.
Pressure from religious conservatives was the main reason why Bush got
involved in Sudan. Religious conservatives shaped the U.S. policy agenda,
but not the policy substance once the administration had become in-
volved, the paper concludes. Nevertheless, religious conservatives are a
group which needs to be taken into consideration when trying to under-
stand U.S. foreign policy in recent years. 
Apart from academic literature, this paper is also based on first-hand inter-
views with leading religious conservative policy-makers in Washington D.C.
KEYWORDS:  US foreign policy, religion, interest groups, Sudan, peace process

Introduction and background1
Evangelical Christians in America face a historic opportu-
nity. We make up fully one quarter of all voters in the
most powerful nation in history. Never before has God
given American evangelicals such an awesome opportunity
to shape public policy in ways that could contribute to the
well-being of the entire world. Disengagement is not an
option. We must seek God’s face for biblical faithfulness
and abundant wisdom to rise to this unique challenge.
– Opening words from “For the Health of the Nation”, policy document
adopted by National Association of Evangelicals on October 7, 2004.
 
Since the late 1960s, religious conservatives have been fuelling the do-
mestic political debate on issues such as abortion, same-sex marriage
and stem-cell research in the United States. But less well documented
is that since the mid 1990s the same groups have also become increas-
ingly visible in the field of foreign policy. Faith-based lobbyists led by
evangelical Christians claim they are the main reason why religious
freedom legislation has been passed by Congress, why President Bush
has increased the aid budget to Africa by 67 percent, and why the
United States continues to be Israel’s strongest ally, to mention just a
few examples. According to the U.S. foreign-policy scholar Walter
Russell Mead at The Council on Foreign Relations, “the recent surge in
the number and the power of evangelicals is recasting the country’s po-
litical scene – with dramatic implications for foreign policy.”2 Mead’s
cover story “God’s Country?” in Foreign Affairs is a recent example of a
1 This article is an edited version of a master’s thesis in political science submitted to
the University of Oslo in May 2007. A more thorough discussion on theory and
methodology can be found in this thesis. Thank you to my tutor Svein Melby
(autumn 2006/spring 2007) for guidance on the thesis; as well as Johannes Rø,
Anders Romarheim, Michael Mayer, Olof Kronvall, Jostein Askim and Birgitte
Iversen for giving feedback and reading through drafts; plus two anonymous review-
ers for valuable remarks as the thesis was edited into this article.
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growing corpus of scholarly work recognizing the influence of religious
conservatives in U.S. foreign policy-making, and the fact that this in-
fluence extends beyond just abortion and Israel.3 Although Mead’s
claim is at least in part a prediction of evangelical influence in years to
come, he also refers to several cases when evangelicals are said to have
already altered U.S. policy priorities, such as the peace treaty that ended
twenty-three years of civil war between Northern and Southern Sudan
in 2005. “Thanks to evangelical pressure, (…) the [United States] has
led the fight to end Sudan’s wars,” Mead claims.4 
Are Mead’s claims true? Has the recasting of the religious landscape
in the U.S. altered the country’s foreign policy? And is this evident in
U.S. policy towards Sudan? These questions will be discussed in this ar-
ticle. A number of studies have emphasized the Bush administration’s
deep involvement in the Sudanese peace process as an example of the in-
fluence of religious conservative lobby groups on the administration’s
policies.5 But none of these has studied in detail the influence of such
groups on the policy-making process.6 The aim of the following case
study which looks into the evangelical influence on U.S. Sudan policy
is: 1) to shed light on how these conservative religious groups worked
to influence policy in this particular case; 2) to use the case study to
make generalizations about the evangelical influence on U.S. foreign
policy; and 3) to peek into the “black box” of foreign policy to discuss
how domestic politics influences foreign policy. But first, some back-
ground in brief will be presented about the role of religion in American
politics, the rise and recent revival of the evangelical movement and
how this movement in recent years has become an influential foreign-
policy pressure group.
2 Walter Russell Mead, “God’s Country”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 5 (2006): 24–43.
The quote is taken from the summary of Mead’s article on Foreign Affair’s web page
[online 1 Dec 2006].
3 Elliott Abrams, ed., The Influence of Faith. Religious Groups and US Foreign Policy (New
York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); Allen D. Hertzke, Freeing God’s Children. The
Unlikely Alliance for Global Human Rights, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004);
Elizabeth Castelli, “Praying for the Persecuted Church: US Christian Activism in the
Global Arena”, Journal of Human Rights, vol. 4, no. 3 (2005): 321–351; Martin Dur-
ham, “Evangelical Protestantism and Foreign Policy in the United States after Sep-
tember 11”, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 38, no. 2 (2004): 145–158; Dan Gilgoff, The
Jesus Machine. How James Dobson, Focus on the Family, and Evangelical America are Win-
ning the Culture War (New York: St. Martins Press, 2007), pp. 268– 282; William
Martin, “The Christian Right and American Foreign Policy”, Foreign Policy, no. 114
(1999): 66– 80; Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transforma-
tion of International Relations. The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-first Century, (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Although not widely covered, mainstream US
media has noted this phenomenon in recent years as well. 
4 Mead, “God’s Country”: 38.
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Religion and politics in the United States
The United States is by far the most religious of the world’s developed
nations. Surveys show that 85–90 percent of all Americans say they be-
lieve in God. Around 70 percent are members of a church or synagogue,
and around 40 percent attend religious services every week – all num-
bers far beyond most Western European nations.7 Christianity is easily
the largest and most influential religion, and Protestantism is the larg-
est denomination.
The United States was born of religious zeal, and religion has great-
ly influenced politics ever since the first Puritan refugees landed on
American shores in the 1600s. In the 1730s and 1740s, the religious re-
vivalist movement inspired the break from England a few years later.
Religion was central to the battle over slavery in the 1850s: supporters
of slavery used the Christian faith to pacify their slaves, but Christianity
also became a vehicle for blacks to organize themselves politically and
served as a motivation for the abolitionists. And since the 1960s, reli-
giously motivated battles over issues such as abortion have dominated
public debate.
There are many more examples. Indeed, studies into the relation-
ship between religion and politics in American history seem to agree on
one thing - religion shapes American culture in profound ways, includ-
ing its political culture.8 The religious heritage from the Puritans and
evangelicals helps explain the U.S.’ self-perception of Americans being
an exceptional people with a mission to lead the world, whether it be by
spreading American values or acting as a moral example (from the “city
upon a hill”, as the Puritan leader John Winthrop put it). And it helps
explain why all American presidents from George Washington to
George W. Bush have drawn heavily on religious rhetoric in their
speeches.9
Religion provides leaders with moral road-maps, guides them in
the ethical aspects of decisions, and colors the way they view reality.10
5 “U.S. – Sudan – Caution, lobbies at work”, Africa Confidential, vol. 42, no. 7 (2001);
Dan Connell, “Sudan. Recasting U.S. Policy”, Foreign Policy in Focus Self-Determination
Series, vol. 5, no. 40 (2001); John C. Danforth, Faith and Politics. How the “Moral Val-
ues” Debate Divides America and How to Move Forward Together (New York: Viking,
2006); Peter Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2006).
6 I have not come over any such studies, anyway. The only exception is a political scien-
tist at Oklahoma University, Allen D. Hertzke. The problem with Hertzke’s book
Freeing God’s Children is, however, that he openly admits being a sympathetic insider
to the movement, and he does not provide a balanced judgment of the actual policy
impact of the Sudan campaign.
7 Jeff Haynes, Religion in Global Politics (London: Pearson Longman, 1998).
8 Robert Booth Fowler and Allen D. Hertzke, Religion and Politics in America. Faith,
Culture and Strategic Choices (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995); Mark A.
Noll, A history of Christianity in the United States and Canada (Grand Rapids, Michi-
gan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1992); Leo P. Ribuffo, “Religion in
the History of U.S. Foreign Policy”, in The Influence of Faith …, ed. Elliott Abrams. 
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So there seems to be little doubt that religion has an indirect impact on
politics through the realm of ideas. It is more difficult to prove whether
religion or religious groups influence politics more directly, or when re-
ligious communities act as foreign-policy pressure groups. However,
despite the historian of religion Leo P. Ribuffo’s contention that “no
major diplomatic decision has turned on religious issues alone”, this has
occurred several times during the history of the U.S..11 One example is
the Israel lobby. Ribuffo notes the swift recognition of Israel by the U.S.
in 1948 as “a victory for one of the great grassroots lobbying efforts in
American history”.12 And, according to a now (in)famous article by
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt about the Israel lobby, “the thrust
of U.S. policy in [the Middle East] derives almost entirely from domes-
tic politics, and especially the activities of the ‘Israel lobby’”.13 This lob-
by consists of not only the Jewish community, but today also “includes
prominent Christian evangelicals”.14 The political influence of evangel-
icals is the subject of this study.
The rise, fall and revival of evangelicals
Evangelicalism is a branch of Protestantism that emphasizes a literal in-
terpretation of the Bible, stresses the importance of converting as an
adult (to “accept Christ” and to be “born again”); and evangelizes aggres-
sively to convert non-believers.15 The evangelical movement first came
into being in the early eighteenth century due to the efforts of preachers
such as Jonathan Edwards, John Wesley and George Whitefield, and
quickly became the dominant strain of Protestantism in Puritan New
England, where its emphasis on simple yet fervent bible-based preaching
seemed to have especially fertile ground.16 It remained the dominant re-
ligious force in the U.S. until the beginning of the twentieth century (its
decline occurring somewhere between 1870–1920), when broad societal
changes (the rise of Darwinism, general modernization and urbanization)
9 John B. Judis, “The Chosen Nation. The Influence of Religion on U.S. Foreign Pol-
icy”, Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief, no. 37 (2005); Gary Scott Smith, Faith and the
Presidency. From George Washington to George W. Bush. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2006).
10 Mark R. Amstutz,. “Faith-based NGOs and U.S. Foreign Policy“ in The Influence of
Faith …, ed. Elliott Abrams.
11 Ribuffo, “Religion in the History of U.S. Foreign Policy”, p. 21.
12 Ibid., p. 15.
13 John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “The Israel Lobby”, London Review of Books, vol.
28, no. 6 (23 March 2006).
14 Ibid.
15 Fowler and Hertzke, Religion and Politics in America, p. 14. 
16 This brief historical overview is based on George M. Marsden, Understanding Funda-
mentalism and Evangelicalism (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Pub-
lishing Company, 1991); Fowler and Hertzke, Religion and Politics in America; and
Noll, A history of Christianity ….
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led to a spiritual crisis and a split between religious modernizers and
conservatives. The modernizers were willing to modify evangelical doc-
trines to remain credible in a modern age. The conservatives wanted to
retain a literal belief in the doctrines of the Bible. By the 1920s, after the
Scopes Trial, many of these conservatives were calling themselves funda-
mentalists and had by and large withdrawn from public and political
life.17 Another branch of conservatives chose to stay within the mainline
denominations. These were called “neo-evangelicals” (later just evangel-
icals).18 Today, the term “evangelical” is used on any Christian conserva-
tive enough to affirm the basic beliefs of the old nineteenth-century
evangelicalism.19 “Evangelical” includes fundamentalists, who may be
considered to be a militant subgroup of evangelicals – or, as the funda-
mentalist preacher Jerry Falwell likes to put it, “a fundamentalist is an
evangelical who is angry about something”.20 
By the 1920s, evangelicals had practically disappeared from the ra-
dar screen, and their sudden re-emergence in the 1970s as a social and
political force surprised most observers. Today, evangelicals are the
most numerous and salient religious subgroup in the United States.
Though the number of Christians has grown considerably in tandem
with population growth since the 1960s, membership in mainline, lib-
eral denominations has dropped sharply: from 29 to 22 million between
1960 and 2003.21 The drop in market share is even more dramatic. In
1960, 25 percent of all members of religious groups belonged to one of
the seven leading Protestant denominations; by 2003, this had dropped
to 15 percent.22 At the same time, the number of members of the main
evangelical denominations has exploded. The largest, the Southern
Baptist Convention, has gained more members than the main liberal
denominations combined have lost. Furthermore, the number of evan-
gelicals or born-again Christians within the mainline denominations
has increased. Today, a majority of Protestants in the States define
themselves as evangelicals and they constitute around one quarter of the
total population of the country – some 75 million people.23 
17 John T. Scopes was a young high-school teacher in Tennessee, who was brought to
trial by the state for breaking the antievolution law by teaching Darwinism in school.
The case got enormous attention in the press, and the state ultimately lost. 
18 In addition, a number of neo-evangelicals came from fundamentalist churches and
organizations. In the years after the Scopes trial, they began to question the decision
to withdraw from society, many of them influenced by Carl F. H. Henry, the early
editor of Christianity Today, who had a profound influence on the neo-evangelical
movement. See Carl F.H. Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1947).
19 Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism …, p. 4.
20 Ibid., p. 1. 
21 Mead, “God’s Country”: 36. 
22 Ibid.
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What can explain this sudden and dramatic change in the religious
landscape? On the surface, the rise of religious conservativism as a po-
litical force is a counter-revolution. Just as the first rise of fundamental-
ism was a reaction to the secularization of society in the late 1800s, the
revival of the religious right in the 1960s started as a direct response to
events such as the civil rights movement, the rise of a liberal counter-
culture (visible above all in the protests against the Vietnam War) and
the 1973 Supreme Court decision on abortion. Conservative churches
promised certainty in times of uncertainty; clear, biblical answers to
complex societal problems.24 But to understand the rise of the Christian
Right, one also has to take into account some predisposing circumstanc-
es in American religion, such as its “this-worldly” orientation (i.e. what
you do in life matters, as opposed to fatalism), its emphasis on values
and morality and its massive institutional resources. In the late 1960s,
conservative church leaders, having built a strong organizational net-
work in the previous decades, capitalized on their resources and cen-
tered around conservative radio networks, television stations, bible
groups, think tanks and leadership networks.25 
It is important to note that the rise of the Christian Right has not
only been a Protestant evangelical revival. In all denominations, there
has been a shift from liberal to more conservative strains. The main re-
ligious divide in American religion today is no longer between Protes-
tants and Catholics, but between liberals and conservatives within all
denominations. Likewise, people’s political behavior is not predicted by
their denomination, but by whether they are a religious modernist or a
traditionalist.26 Several different terms are used to describe the conser-
vative branches of all beliefs. In this study, I shall from now on refrain
from using the terms Christian Right and religious right, since these
political terms do not fit all the groups I am studying. There are reli-
gious conservatives also on the left of American politics. Political activ-
ist and founder of the organization Sojourners, Jim Wallis, is a
prominent example of a religious conservative who campaigns on issues
traditionally associated with the political left in the U.S.27 And several
23 Estimate made by Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, “American Evangelicals
and Israel”, fact sheet, 15 April 2005 [online 2 Mar 2007]. But because evangelicals
are found in all denominations and have a low degree of institutional identity, the
estimates vary from 40 to 100 millions, depending on how the question is framed in
surveys, and by which definition is used. Most estimates are in the upper range of this
spectrum though.
24 Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism …, p. 105.
25 Robert Wuthnow, The Restructuring of American Religion. Society and Faith Since World
War II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
26 John C. Green, “The American Religious Landscape and Political Attitudes. A Base-
line for 2004”, survey report (Washington DC: Pew Forum on Religion and Public
Life, 9 November 2004) [online 21 Dec 2006].
27 Jim Wallis, God’s Politics: Why the Right Gets It Wrong and the Left Doesn’t Get It (San
Francisco: Harper, 2006).
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of the evangelical foreign-policy campaigners label themselves cen-
trists, not members of the Christian Right.28 However, these political
liberals and conservatives share a conservative religious belief, so terms
such as religious conservatives and conservative Christians will be used
alternately to describe the faith-based activists which I am studying.
These terms cover evangelical Christians as well as the conservative
Catholics and Jews within the coalition. Nevertheless, the revival of
conservative Protestants (evangelicals) is the main focus of this thesis,
and I shall also use the term evangelical when I describe evangelicals
specifically.
It should be noted here that the term “evangelical” is contested
within American Christianity as well. Adherents to mainline denomi-
nations such as the theologically liberal Evangelical Lutheran Church of
America (ECLA) also subscribe to the label.29 However, I have chosen
to retain the term “evangelical” and not, for instance, use “conservative
evangelical”, as evangelical is a well established term in the literature
from the field, and the evangelical groups which are the subject of this
study use this term to describe themselves.30
Religious conservatives expand their agenda
The impact of the shift towards more conservative religious beliefs is
not hard to find in domestic politics in the United States. Political and
legal battles over issues such as abortion, gay rights and stem-cell re-
search have been a dominant part of the political landscape since the
1970s. A plethora of books analyzes these “culture wars”.31 But far less
attention has been given to the Christian-conservative influence on for-
eign policy.32 One reason might be the impact of political realism, the
belief that foreign policy to a greater degree than domestic policy is
viewed as an area of strategic calculation and national interests. Another
may be the impact of so-called secularization theory, the belief that the
impact of religion on public life diminishes as modernization moves
28 Richard Cizik, vice president at the National Association of Evangelicals is one exam-
ple: Richard Cizik, personal interview with author, 8 February 2007.
29 In fact, presiding bishop of the ECLA, Mark S. Hanson, told in a personal interview
that one of his great frustrations has been that the term evangelical has been “taken
away” from his church and reserved for religious conservatives. See Mark S. Hanson,
personal interview with author, February 2007.
30 Marsden and Whutnow both use the term evangelical as defined in this paper. See See
Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism …; and Wuthnow, The Restructuring of Ameri-
can Religion.
31 The phrase was made famous by James Davison Hunter’s book Culture Wars: The
Struggle to Define America in 1991. For a good discussion on this topic written by two
Englishmen outside the struggle, see John Micklethwait and Adrian Woolbridge,
The Right Nation. Conservative Power in America (New York: Penguin, 2004).
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forward. However, over the past few years, religion seems to have been
rediscovered as part of the foreign-policy calculus.33 
This study is based on the assumptions that domestic politics does
affect foreign policy; and that religious groups are part of this political
debate. A look at the foreign-policy debate in the United States since
the 1980s clearly shows that Christian groups have been very visible.
Their achievements may be divided into four main areas:
1. Expansion of the domestic agenda. Since the 1980s, religious conser-
vatives have taken the battle over abortion, sexual abstention,
gay rights and other so-called moral issues into the international
arena. Conservative Christians campaigned strongly before the
launch of President Reagan’s “Mexico City Policy”, which
decreed that no overseas agency that promoted abortion could
receive federal assistance from the U.S..34 The UN has been a
favorite whipping boy, and is widely considered to be a corrupt
cradle of secular ideas – in some Christian-conservative circles, it
is even judged to be the Anti-Christ.35 But campaigning against
UN programs and conventions has also meant working within
the “Anti-Christ’s” system, and may have helped make the UN
more legitimate in the eyes of many conservatives.36
2. New emphasis on foreign aid. Religious conservatives have not only
contributed to aid being withheld, but also to U.S. aid to poor
countries being increased. Under George W. Bush, aid to Africa
has risen by 67 percent, including 15 billion dollars in new
funds to combat HIV/Aids.37 This is widely attributed to cam-
paigning by evangelical lobby groups, particularly their links
with Michael Gerson, himself an evangelical, who as policy
adviser to and speechwriter for President Bush was called the
social conscience of the White House.38
32 Whereas the studies on the Christian Right can be counted in the hundreds, I have
only come over one monograph (Hertzke, Freeing God’s Children) and one collection of
essays (Abrams, The Influence of Faith) entirely devoted to religious conservative’s for-
eign policy agendas (not including the several books on the Christian Right and
Israel, the impact of George W. Bush’s personal beliefs and a number of shorter arti-
cles). 
33 Abrams, The Influence of Faith; Peter L. Berger, ed., The Desecularization of the World.
Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdman
Publishing Company, 1999); Bryan J. Hehir, ed., Liberty and Power: A Dialogue on
Religion and U.S. Foreign Policy in an Unjust World (Washington DC: Brookings Insti-
tution Press, 2004); Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion …
34 This policy was lifted under President Clinton, but reinstated again under President
Bush. See Jim Lobe, “Population Activists Angered by Bush Freeze on UN Fund”,
oneworld.net, 15 January 2002 [online 21 Dec 2006].
35 In the fiction novel series “Left Behind”, which has sold 63 million copies since the
1970s, the Secretary General of the United Nations is depicted as Anti-Christ. 
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3. Strong support for Israel. Today, what is known as the Israel lobby
does not only consist of Israelis or Jews. There are also evangeli-
cal Christian. The evangelicals’ literal understanding of Biblical
doctrine makes them Israel’s staunchest supporters in the United
States, as a widespread Christian view is that Christians, not Jews
represent the new and true children of Israel. A majority of evan-
gelicals base their belief in this on the prophecies of the Old Tes-
tament which say that God has given Israel (including the West
Bank) to the Jews, and that the Jews will have to occupy the
Holy Land before Christ can return.39 Many also believe the
majority of Jews will turn to Christ just before he returns, which
reduces the need for conversion to build an alliance between the
two groups. The exact impact of the evangelical groups on the
Israel lobby, and the lobby’s impact on U.S. foreign policy, is
hard to measure. Mearsheimer and Walt nonetheless contend
that the lobby is the main reason why the United States is Israel’s
staunchest supporter.40 And Walter Russell Mead contends that
the evangelicals’ contribution to the continued, strong U.S. sup-
port for Israel will be one of their main foreign-policy legacies.41
4. Campaign against religious persecution. The latest development
within faith-based activism in the United States is a steady cam-
paign to combat the persecution of Christian minorities in far
corners of the world. In the mid-1990s, a congressional lobby
campaign was developed by a number of highly motivated and
well-connected individuals in Washington D.C. think tanks and
within the political wings of evangelical denominations. Their
campaigning and alliances with central lawmakers on Capitol
Hill seem to have contributed considerably to the signing of five
congressional acts: 
i) The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 made the pro-
motion of religious freedom abroad an explicit foreign-policy
goal for the United States, one of only two countries in the
world to do so.42 The Act established an office within the
36 Jennifer Butler, “New Sheriff in Town. The Christian Right Nears Major Victory at
the United Nations”, opinion paper, publiceye.org, 2003 (Political Research Associates
[online 21 Dec 2006]).
37 Mead, “God’s Country”.
38 “Right on”, Economist, 30 June 2005.
39 In a Pew survey from 2003, 62 percent of the evangelicals say “Israel fulfils biblical
prophecy about second coming”, compared to 36 percent in the population as a
whole. 72 percent say God gave land of Israel to the Jews, compared to 44 percent of
all those surveyed. Pew Forum, “American Evangelicals and Israel.”
40 Mearsheimer and Walt, “The Israel Lobby.”
41 Mead, God’s Country.
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State Department, an ambassador-at-large and an indepen-
dent commission, all designated to advise the government
how countries perform on religious freedom. Countries given
poor ratings can face economic sanctions at the order of the
President. 
ii) The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 was motivated by
stories of Christian women being enslaved and becoming sex-
trade victims in Muslim countries.43 It gave the President
new powers to order sanctions against countries which did
not fight trafficking. New legislation signed by President
Bush in January 2006 will provide an estimated 360 million
dollars to fight human trafficking.44
iii) The Sudan Peace Act of 2002: its aim was to bring pressure to
bear on the Muslim regime in Khartoum by opening up for
direct aid to the Christian rebels in the South for the first
time, and by establishing benchmarks for Khartoum’s con-
duct in the ongoing peace negotiations. The benchmarks
were accompanied by the threat of direct sanctions. 
iv) The North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004 required President
Bush to appoint a special envoy for human rights for North
Korea and states that human rights in the country shall be a
“key element in future negotiations between the United
States, North Korea and other concerned parties in Northeast
Asia”. Korea has been a major area of evangelization for more
than a century, and American missionaries estimate that some
100,000 Christians, persecuted because of their faith, are in
North Korean jails.45 
v) The Advance Democracy Act of 2005 states that promoting
“freedom and democracy in foreign countries [shall be] a fun-
damental component of United States foreign policy”. It aims
to establish a new Office of Democratic Movements and Tran-
sitions at the State Department and requires the Department
to issue an annual democracy report. It was introduced by the
42 The Vatican city-state is the other one. Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, “Legis-
lating International Religious Freedom”, event transcript, 20 November 2006
[online 21 Dec 2006]. 
43 Hertzke, Freeing God’s Children, pp. 315–335.
44 Robert MacMahon, “Christian Evangelicals and US Foreign Policy”, Council on For-
eign Relations Backgrounder, 28 August 2006 [online 21 Dec 2006]. These efforts have
been noted by the Norwegian newspaper Verdens Gang as well: Hanne Skartveit, “Vår
tids slaver” [The slaves of our time], Verdens Gang, 24 February 2007.
45 Jasper Becker, “Christian underground smuggles North Koreans to safety in South”,
San Francisco Chronicle, 15 February 2003.
FOREIGN POLICY IN GOD’S NAME 15
same group of evangelical politicians and pressure groups
who initiated the previous four laws.46 
Saving Sudan
As a whole, these achievements seem to add up to a considerable evan-
gelical influence on U.S. foreign policy in recent years. However, there
are two major difficulties involved in drawing such a conclusion based
on this brief review. First, as mentioned in the introduction, no de-
tailed, in-depth case studies have been performed to investigate and
weigh up claims of evangelical influence as opposed to other explana-
tions for U.S. policy. Second, these points do not necessarily add up to
major changes in the direction of U.S. foreign policy; the U.S. has al-
ways been Israel’s strongest supporter, even long before the evangelical
revival. The launch of a new 15 billion dollar aid program does not
mean that the promised increases actually are implemented in the end.
The fact that the U.S. now has a law on religious persecution does not
imply that that the U.S. is aggressively pursuing a policy against reli-
gious persecution around the world. And the fact that human rights ac-
cording to Congress are supposed to be central in U.S. policy towards
North Korea does not mean that they are. In fact, the religious lobby
groups themselves have complained several times that the laws they
have campaigned for have yet to make any significant impact.47 
It might be the case that the influence of new conservative Christians
has altered U.S. foreign policy. But this case may also be overstated by
placing too much emphasis on symbolic policies and congressional deci-
sions, and too little emphasis on the implementation and the relative im-
portance of the policies. With these objections in mind, I have chosen
U.S. policy towards Sudan under President George W. Bush as a case
study against which to assess the evangelical (in a coalition with other
religious conservatives) influence on U.S. foreign policy. The reason I
have chosen Sudan is first of all that this is an area where there has been
a marked shift in policy: from the Clinton administration’s hands-off ap-
proach to the active involvement of President Bush. Mead and other ob-
servers claim this changes largely due to the lobbying of conservative
Christians with almost unlimited access to Bush’s White House. Sec-
ondly, there were opposing lobbying interests at play in the case of
46 John Feffer, “All Democracy, All the Time”, Salon.com, 15 March 2005 [online 19 Dec
2006].
47 Horowitz, personal interview with author, 7 February 2007; Deborah Fikes, “The
Grassroots Movement of North Korea Advocacy Efforts and Role of Evangelical
Christians”, speech given at Institute for Corean-American Studies, 11 October 2005;
Pew Forum, “Legislating religious freedom”. 
Sudan: the oil and business lobbies favored a different approach from that
of the Christian-conservatives. Thirdly, national security interests be-
came an increasingly important part of U.S. policy considerations in
Sudan after September 11 2001, and the national security interest was
not the same as the conservative Christian interest. 
I will elaborate on this argument in my analysis, but in short it is
as follows: by the end of 2000, Sudan was not a country in which one
would expect the United States to invest much political capital. And if
the U.S. were to intervene, both economic and security interests seemed
to indicate a policy in favor of the regime in Khartoum, not a confron-
tational line favoring the Christians in the south as the religious conser-
vatives propagated. 
A case study may disclose that other interest groups and/or interests
are just as plausible explanations for U.S. policy towards Sudan as pres-
sure from conservative Christians. But if it seems likely that the United
States became heavily involved in Sudan because of evangelical pressure,
and that the actual policy towards Sudan corresponded to the policy in-
put of the evangelicals and not to those of other vital interests, then this
would strengthen Walter Russell Mead’s claims of a “recasting” of for-
eign policy. We may in fact be witnessing an example of what Mead
calls a “Wilsonian revival” in U.S. foreign policy.48 
48 Walter Russell Mead, Power, Terror, Peace and War. America’s Grand Strategy in a World
at Risk, 2nd ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), p. 88.
  Interest groups and
foreign policy
Interest groups defined
A study of the influence of lobby groups rests on the basic premise that
people organize themselves into groups to promote their interests. “The
causes of faction are sown in the nature of man,” James Madison wrote in
The Federalist Papers.49 His definition of faction still serves as a definition
of an interest or pressure group: “By a faction, I understand a number of
citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole,
who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of
interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community.”50 In this study, evangelical
groups are treated as a faction according to Madison’s definition. They are
united by a common impulse to protect fellow Christians from persecu-
tion. Whether they are averse to the rights of other Americans is perhaps
debatable, but they are certainly averse to the Islamist regime in Sudan. 
Theories on foreign-policy interest groups
A large body of literature exists on the role of interest groups in policy-
making. The classic studies are, however, preoccupied with interest
groups oriented towards economic and domestic policy.51 Mancur Ol-
49 James Madision, “Federalist 10” in The Federalist Papers, 2nd ed., ed. Roy P. Fairfield
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1981), p. 16. 
50 Ibid.
51 This section is based on the overview given in Burdett A. Loomis and Allan J. Cigler,
“Introduction: The Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics” in Interest Group Pol-
itics, ed. Cigler and Loomis (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2002). Classic theories
include: Arthur Bentley, “The Process of Government”, 1908, reprint in Pressure
Groups, ed. Jeremy Richardson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Theodore
Lowi, The End of Liberalism, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1979); and Mancur Olson,
“The Logic of Collective Action”, 1965, reprint in abridged form in Pressure Groups,
ed. Richardson.
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son, the man behind one of the classic interest-group theories, noted
that his theory “can be extended to cover communal, religious and phil-
anthropic organizations, but the theory is not particularly useful in
studying such groups.”52 Furthermore, traditional interest-group theo-
ries are mostly concerned with describing the proliferation of interest
groups, not their influence. This might be due to the fact that deter-
mining actual influence is, as one lobbyist has noted, “like finding a
black cat in the coal bin at midnight”.53 
These facts make traditional interest-group theories ill suited for
the purposes of this thesis. The theoretical body of interest-group influ-
ence on foreign policy is much less developed. One reason is probably
that the tradition Walter Russell Mead calls “continental realism” is so
strong in the study of international relations.54 Nevertheless, assuming
that states as foreign policy-makers cannot be considered to be “black
boxes”, one has to consider domestic politics. Domestic politics mat-
ters: and interest groups matter in the decision-making process. 
As little has been written about religious lobby groups’ influence on
foreign policy, little theory exists. One may, however, make some as-
sumptions about the nature of this influence based on theory within a
similar subject field: ethnic lobby groups and foreign policy. From the
Israel lobby to the Greek, Taipei-Chinese and Cuban lobbies, ethnic
groups in the United States have often influenced U.S. policies towards
the groups’ countries of origin. Based on studies of ethnic lobby groups,
one may extract the following criteria as indicators of likely success
when attempting to influence U.S. policy. These indicators may also be
used to discuss the likely influence of religious groups:55 
• most importantly, groups must pressure for a policy in line with 
U.S. strategic interests.
• ethnic groups must be assimilated into U.S. society, yet retain 
enough identification with the “old country” so that this foreign-
policy issue motivates people to take some political action. For reli-
gious groups this may be translated into identification with the 
country or group they are lobbying on behalf of. 
• the policies that are advocated ought to be backed by the broader 
public.
52 Olson, “The Logic of Collective Action”, p. 25.
53 Quoted in Loomis and Cigler, Interest Group Politics, p. 28.
54 Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence. American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the
World, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 35–55.
55 The first two criteria are taken from Mohammed E. Ahrari, ed., Ethnic Groups and
Foreign Policy (New York: Greenwood, 1987), pp. 155–158; number three to five are
listed in Eric M. Uslaner, “Cracks in the Armour? Interest Groups and Foreign Pol-
icy” in Interest Groups Politics, eds Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis (Washington
DC: CQ Press, 2002), p. 358.
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• the groups must have members enough to be able to wield political 
influence. Here, one may include other resources: skilful staff, 
active members and strategically placed allies.
• the groups must be perceived as pursuing a legitimate interest.
These are general indicators of lobby groups’ chances of influencing a
foreign-policy issue. Since most studies of ethnic lobbies deal with lob-
bying in Congress, one may include a few other indicators of influence
on Congress specifically:56 
• pressure directly from a representative’s constituency gives a repre-
sentative incentives to act.
• personal access to decision-makers may secure direct action, as rep-
resentatives act as individual “entrepreneurs” and not as party rep-
resentatives.
• success is more likely if there is no competition from other groups 
or groups with conflicting views on the issue.
• an ability to build broad and unlikely coalitions, so-called “strange 
bedfellows”, produces a greater potential for breakthrough in Con-
gress. 
Congress’ influence on foreign policy-making is often limited, however,
and one may add one last criterion for success:57
• the ability to lobby the executive directly is a measure of an interest 
group’s influence.
This adds up to a list of ten indicators of interest groups’ influence on
foreign policy-making. Many of these are commonsense assumptions,
but it is advantageous that most of them have also been tested in studies
of ethnic lobbies. As an example, the pro-Israel lobby has been cited as
the most prominent example of a group that has satisfied most of the
first seven criteria and has therefore been very influential for many years.
The pro-Arab lobby, on the other hand, does not meet any of the seven
criteria and remains a weak force in American foreign policy-making.58
56 Criterion five to nine are based on Cecil V.Crabb Jr., Glenn J. Antizzo, and Leila E.
Sarieddine, Congress and the Foreign Policy Process (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Uni-
versity Press, 2000), pp. 137–155.
57 This indicator is the author’s own addition. Crabb et.al., Congress and the Foreign Policy
Process, p. 138, claim Congress’ influence is minimal. Randall B. Ripley and James M.
Lindsay, eds, Congress Resurgent. Foreign and Defence Policy on Capitol Hill (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1993) claimed Congress was resurging in foreign pol-
icy matters in the early 90s. Nowadays, talk of the “imperial presidency” is in fashion
again. See Donald R. Wolfensberger, “The Return of the Imperial Presidency?” Wil-
son Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 2 (2002): 53–56.
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Questions concerning U.S. policy towards Sudan
How does one define U.S. policy towards Sudan? To answer this, one
first needs to determine who conducts U.S. foreign policy. According to
the U.S. Constitution, foreign policy is primarily the President’s do-
main. He is the chief diplomat who with his cabinet conducts foreign
policy on a day-to-day basis. He makes diplomatic appointments, nego-
tiates treaties and sets policies through speeches and directives. There-
fore, the policies of the President and his administration are the main
objects of this investigation. Congress also has a formal role in foreign
policy-making, through scrutiny, budgets and the approval of appoint-
ments and treaties. In the case of evangelical influence, the role of Con-
gress is interesting since congressional legislation has been one of the
evangelicals’ main areas as a pressure group. Therefore, I shall return to
a discussion of what influence congressional law-making has over pres-
idential decision-making in the foreign-policy field in my case analysis. 
Walter Russell Mead and others claim the evangelicals’ main con-
tribution has been to draw and alter the attention of the foreign policy-
makers. Therefore, I shall first look at attention, via the level of rhetoric:
how often is Sudan mentioned in administration speeches, statements
and policy documents? And, more importantly, in which speeches and
documents, and by whom is Sudan mentioned? But foreign policy is
more than attention. Mentioning the misery in Sudan now and then
does not necessarily mean Sudan is a high foreign-policy priority.
Therefore, the second aspect of my analysis is policy substance. Is it
true, as Mead claims, that the U.S. “led the fight to end Sudan’s wars”?59
And if so, what kind of political investments did this leadership de-
mand? I shall discuss substance by looking at which specific measures
the Bush administration utilized towards Sudan, compared to the Clin-
ton administration, and by discussing the level and intensity of the in-
volvement. 
On the use of sources
Since the presidential records of the Bush administration have not yet
been disclosed, I have had to rely on open sources to peek into the ad-
ministration’s deliberations. Existing research, though limited, has pro-
vided material for literature review. As have news stories. I have
systematically searched the of news archives of the newspapers The New
York Times and The Washington Post for Sudan stories, as well as searched
58 Uslaner, “Cracks in the Armour? …”, pp. 358–364. Uslaner claims, however, that
the Israel lobby has failed to meet several of the conditions in recent years, so the
lobby is not the same dominant force as it used to be. Mearsheimer and Walt, “The
Israel Lobby”, seem not to share this view.
59 Mead, “God’s Country”: 38.
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the religious press, such as the evangelical magazine Christianity Today.
I have looked in particular for op-ed pieces by and interviews with reli-
gious leaders as well as their policy statements to get an impression of
these groups’ activities and views. Archives on the web pages of the var-
ious campaign organizations also provided material, as did transcripts
of testimonies at congressional hearings, presidential speeches and tran-
scripts of hearings from press conferences with the President as well as
administration officials, and congressional hearings. Finally, I conduct-
ed first-hand interviews with lobbyists, observers of the Sudan cam-
paign and analysts of Sudan in Washington D.C. All the interviews
were on the record and all statements are openly attributed to the inter-
viewees in the text.60 
60 A list of names and titles of the interviewees is included as an appendix.

 Evangelicals and
US policy on Sudan
U.S. policy in Sudan before 2001
When the warring factions in Northern and Southern Sudan signed a
peace treaty in January 2005, they ended a 21-year long civil war which
had claimed an estimated two million lives.61 The latest in a number of
civil wars erupted when the national government in the North revoked
in 1983 the autonomy that the South had been granted for 11 years. The
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) took up arms against the
North under its armed faction the SPLA, led by John Garang. Muslims
opposed to Khartoum, organized in the National Democratic Alliance
(NDA), later joined these rebels. 
Although most commonly portrayed as a conflict between Muslim
oppressors in the North and Christian and animist rebels fighting for
autonomy in the South, the roots of the conflict are more complex.
Sudan’s recurring civil wars are a product of several historical factors.62
Among these are the exploitive relationship between the central gov-
ernment in Khartoum (the North) and the peripheries (the South); the
introduction of militant Islam to the Muslim North that sharpened this
divide; the postcolonial legacy and Sudan’s position in the power play
of the cold war.
U.S. policy towards Sudan up until 2001 is commonly interpreted
as a reaction to this last factor: Sudan’s position in the cold-war struggle
determined the U.S. geopolitical interest of the U.S. in the country.63
When Sudan went pro-Soviet Nasserite in 1969, the U.S. put the coun-
61 Randolph Martin, “Sudan’s Perfect War”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 2 (2002)
[online 21 Dec 2006].
62 Douglas C. Johnson lists ten different factors in Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s
Civil Wars (Oxford: The International African Institute, 2003).
63 Connell, “Sudan. Recasting U.S. Policy”; James J. Hentz, “The contending currents
in United States involvement in sub-Saharan Africa”, in Africa in International Politics,
eds Taylor and Williams ( London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 27–29; and Woodward, US
Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa, pp. 17–37.
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try on its enemy list. When neighboring Ethiopia went pro-Soviet in
1977, the U.S. again started supporting Sudan – during the 1980s,
Sudan was the sixth largest recipient of U.S. military aid. But when the
Islamist NIF (National Islamic Front) seized power in 1989, the U.S.
stopped all bilateral aid immediately. As Osama bin Laden had moved
to Sudan, and the regime in Khartoum supported Iraq in the Gulf War
in 1991, the U.S. increased its effort to isolate the country. The Clinton
administration labeled Sudan a “rogue state”, prohibited U.S. invest-
ment and increased anti-Sudan moves in the UN. In 1998, the U.S.
bombed a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum as a reprisal for Sudan’s
suspected harboring of those responsible for the bombing of the U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. And Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright promised U.S. military aid to the SPLM.
None of this did much to stop the civil war that continued to rage
between the North and South. And before 2001, the U.S. had not
shown any great interest in brokering a peace agreement between the
North and South. A peace process had been underway for some years un-
der the seven-country regional development organization, the Intergov-
ernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). But by 2000 this
process had largely stalled. In 1999, Madeleine Albright told a group
of religiously conservative Sudan activists that the U.S. would not
charge Sudan with genocide, though the activists desired this. Such a
designation would require serious action from the government. But the
human rights situation in Sudan was “not marketable to the American
people”, Albright said.64 Two years later, the U.S. had become deeply
involved as the main negotiator in peace talks between North and South
Sudan. What had happened? Possible answers to this will be discussed
in the following analysis. First through a description of the coalition of
religious conservatives who had become involved in Sudan in the late
1990s, then by discussing different explanations for U.S. policy atten-
tion and substance towards Sudan.
Religious conservatives awake
There have been Christians in today’s Sudan far longer than there have
been Christians in the United States. The first Christian missionaries ar-
rived in Sudan from the Middle East in the sixth century. 1300 years
later, the first American missionaries arrived to convert Muslims, tradi-
tional believers and believers in traditional Sudanese Christianity to the
64 Hertzke, Freeing God’s Children, p. 275.
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new gospel.65 The historical roots of the U.S. Christian involvement in
Sudan lie in this missionary movement. 
Walter Russell Mead calls the story of American missionary activity
the “lost history” of American foreign policy. “It has played a much
larger role in the relationship of the United States to the world (…) than
is generally recognized”.66 In tandem with the great revivals of Chris-
tianity in the United States, American missionaries have spread around
the world at an increasing tempo. At the beginning of the twentieth
century, there were around 5000 American protestant missionaries
around the world.67 The vast majority was in Asia, especially in China
and Korea. Protestantism was introduced to Korea by American mis-
sionaries in 1899, and a few years later, Korea was considered such fer-
tile ground for missionaries that Pyongyang, now the capital of
communist North Korea, was widely known as “Asia’s little Jerusa-
lem”.68 Today, around 30 percent of the population in South Korea is
Christian (19 percent Protestant). 
Today, there might be as many as 100,000 Americans serving on
religious missions abroad.69 And the power shift from traditional, main-
line Christianity to the more conservative evangelical branches has been
just as evident in the field of missionary work as in the religious land-
scape in the U.S. Though eight of ten protestant missionaries came from
the mainline denominations at the end of the First World War, those
same churches supplied less than one of ten missionaries by 1996.70 The
influence of the Catholic Church has also declined considerably. Today,
the Southern Baptist Convention alone fields the same number of mis-
sionaries as the entire U.S. Catholic Church, and the same number as all
mainline U.S. denominations combined.71
This long history of missionary activity, combined with the dra-
matic transformation of the missionary field, help explain why religious
conservatives became increasingly aware of the persecution of Christians
in Sudan in the mid-nineties, and decided to launch a campaign for
Christians in Sudan, as well as for those in North Korea and China. An-
65 Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, p. 14.
66 Mead, Special Providence, p. 139. Madeleine Albright makes a similar point in The
Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God and the World (New York: Harper-
Collins, 2006), p. 26. This point may be valid for Norway as well. Mead’s emphasis
on missionary activity as a foreign policy driver bears resemblance to Olav Riste’s
description of the “missionary impulse” as one of the main pillars of Norwegian for-
eign policy history: Olav Riste, Norway’s foreign relations: a history (Oslo: Universitets-
forlaget, 2001).
67 Mead, Special Providence, p. 142.
68 Robert Marquand, “Evangelicals in Korea poised to move north”, Christian Science
Monitor, 11 June 2003.
69 Mead, Special Providence, p. 142.
70 Paul E. Pierson, “The Rise of Christian Mission and Relief Agencies” in The Influence
of Faith. Religious Groups and US Foreign Policy, ed. Elliott Abrams (New York: Rowan
& Littlefield, 2001), p. 160.
71  Hertzke, Freeing God’s Children, p. 20.
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other explanation is the bonds between the existing, native churches in
Sudan and churches in the U.S. Not all activists were missionaries, not
by far. Many American Christians also became involved in Sudan when
they learned how “their” churches were being bombed and burned.
The goal of the campaign that emerged was (and still is) to be Free-
ing God’s Children, as Allen D. Hertzke has called his insider’s account.
Hertzke notes four underlying conditions paving the way for this move-
ment: (1) The spread of evangelical Christianity had shifted the bulk of
the Christian population towards the global South. Whereas 80 percent
of the world’s Christian population lived in Europe and North America
in 1900, this had declined to 40 percent by 2000. (2) The communica-
tions revolution had brought this new Christian population and their
often difficult conditions much closer to fellow Christians in the States
through the news network of the missionaries.72 (3) Furthermore, the
fall of the iron curtain had opened up for new areas for evangelization.
(4) And finally, the revival of the religious conservatives and their orga-
nizational network in the United States had created a powerful move-
ment able to become involved for their persecuted brothers and sisters
worldwide. 
This movement has its organizational roots in movements set up to
counter Communism and its persecution of Christians after the Second
World War. Groups like Voice of the Martyrs, Open Doors with Broth-
er Andrew and Christian Solidarity International smuggled bibles
through the iron curtain and raised money for Christians in the Soviet
Union and China. The iron curtain eventually fell, but religious perse-
cution did not perish with it. Christians in the United States continued
to receive news about persecuted believers in countries like China,
North Korea – and Sudan. “More Christians have been martyred for
their faith in the twentieth century, than in the previous nineteen cen-
turies combined”, human rights lawyer Nina Shea at the Center for Re-
ligious Persecution at Freedom House dramatically claimed in her book
In the Lion’s Den.73 Along with her colleague Paul Marshall’s Their Blood
Cries Out, this book became a rallying call for the lobbying campaign
against religious persecution in the U.S. Congress.74 A campaign that
72 Several places missionaries provide the main source for international news. As Peggy
L. Shriver, former assistant general secretary of the National Council of Churches of
Christ writes: “Combing 30 years of North Carolina’s Gastonia Gazette, 1940–70, (…)
I was struck with how parochial the newspaper was. Almost the only international
news appeared in the Gazette’s religion page, usually reporting missionary accounts”.
Peggy L. Shriver, “Evangelicals and World Affairs”, World Policy Journal, vol. 23, no.
3 (2006): 52.
73 Nina Shea, In the Lion’s Den (Nashville, Tennessee: Broadman & Holman Publishers,
1997), p. ix.
74 Paul Marshall and Lela Gilbert, Their Blood Cries Out. The untold story of persecution
against Christians in the modern world (Dallas: Word Publishing, 1997).
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triumphed as Congress in 1998 passed the International Religious Free-
dom Act. 
The way towards this act was not straightforward, however. Nina
Shea and Michael Horowitz had considerable difficulty getting evangel-
ical policy organizations interested in religious persecution in the mid-
90s. As Allen D. Hertzke notes, American Christianity, including its
evangelical versions, is a pluralized world not easy to unite behind one
single issue (apart perhaps from abortion). A meeting convened by Shea,
Horowitz and Richard Cizik of the National Association of Evangelicals
in early 1996 played an important role in getting central conservative
Christians on board.75 
By the time the International Religious Freedom Act was passed,
Sudan was already high on the religious conservatives’ agenda. Since the
seizure of power by the National Islamic Front in Khartoum in 1989,
American missionaries had been sending news home of a forced Islam-
ization, and even of the mass slaughter of Sudanese Christians in the
South. While traditional historians and secular analysts would empha-
size the complex nature of the civil war, Christian activists bluntly stat-
ed that this was “a war on religion”, as Nina Shea titled an op-ed in the
The Wall Street Journal.76 Neither did missionaries nor their organiza-
tions back home hesitate to use the word genocide to describe what was
being done to their brothers and sisters in Sudan.77 Some even contend-
ed that the loosely estimated two million victims of the war between the
North and South were all Christians that had been purposefully slaugh-
tered, although the victims comprised both Muslims and believers of
old faiths.78 
But it was really the campaign against slavery in Sudan that
prompted evangelical organizations into action in the United States.79
Initiated by the U.S. director of Christian Solidarity International (CSI)
John Eibner, it spurred thousands of Christians in the States to raise
money to redeem Sudanese Christians from Arab slave-traders. Along
75 Hertzke, Freeing God’s Children, pp. 78–89.
76 Secular analyzes include Human Rights Watch, Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights (Wash-
ington DC: Human Rights Watch, 2003) [online 8 Jan 2007]; Johnson, The Root
Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars; and Center for Strategic and International Studies, U.S.
Policy to End Sudan’s War, report of the CSIS Task Force on U.S.-Sudan Policy (2001).
Nina Shea, “A War on Religion” was a letter in Wall Street Journal, 31 July 1998.
77 “Much like a novice writer enchanted with exclamation points, it repeatedly uses the
term “genocidal” to describe the actions of the government in Sudan”, T. Jeremy
Gunn of the American Civil Liberties Union mocked the advisory Commission on
International Religious Freedom’s use of the word in 1999. See T. Jeremy Gunn,
“When Our Allies Persecute”, Religion in the News, vol. 4, no. 3 (2001). Nonetheless,
the House of Representatives followed suit, and labeled Sudan “genocidal” later the
same year. See Nina Shea, “Sudan’s Genocide and U.S. Indifference”, Shma. An online
journal of Jewish responsibility (February 2000) [online 9 Jan 2007].
78 Hertzke, Freeing God’s Children, p. 261.
79 Faith McDonnell, personal interview with author, 5 February 2007; William Saun-
ders, personal interview with author, 5 February 2007.
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with fellow evangelist Charles Jacobs, who founded the American Anti-
Slavery Group in 1994, Eibner claims to have redeemed at least 80,000
slaves by buying off local slave-traders.80 This undertaking caused con-
troversy. Organizations such as UNICEF and Human Rights Watch
criticized the practice, and in 2002 a front-page article in The Washing-
ton Post claimed that SPLA commanders were exploiting the redeemers
by stage-managing transactions and passing off free people as slaves.81
Nevertheless, millions of dollars were raised by evangelical networks in
the States, slavery in Sudan became an issue on Christian television net-
works and a high-school class made national headlines by raising
50,000 dollars for the redemption of slaves.82 
Another course of action was humanitarian relief. Several evangeli-
cal relief organizations were established in Sudan in the 1990s. The
most notable was probably Franklin Graham’s Samaritan’s Purse. Son of
Billy Graham (the father of modern evangelicalism in the States) and
heir to his empire of ministries, Franklin Graham is also one of Presi-
dent Bush’s closest religious confidantes, and held the invocation at the
President’s inauguration ceremony in 2001. Graham visited Sudan sev-
eral times, and wrote and spoke about Sudan in the press. “This carnage,
the most appalling I have seen in my 25 years as an international relief
worker (…) is happening in Sudan, where the Muslim government is
waging a brutal war against Christians,” Graham wrote in an op-ed in
The Wall Street Journal in 2000. He concluded with the following warn-
ing: “If we turn a blind eye to the plight of the people being mistreated
in Africa (…), I believe God will judge this nation. His hand of blessing
could easily and quickly be removed.”83
Graham was not the only top-tier evangelical leader to speak out
about Sudan in the late 1990s: Richard Land, policy director of the
Southern Baptist Convention (by far the nation’s largest protestant de-
nomination) made Sudan part of his policy advocacy. Chuck Colson –
once chief council to President Nixon, and who was jailed for Water-
gate, was born-again as an evangelical in jail and later became the
founder of Prison Fellowship to reform U.S. jails – campaigned for
Sudan through his own think tank the Wilberforce Forum (named after
the English statesman and evangelical who led the fight to abolish sla-
very in the 1800s). Colson is considered one of the best-connected lob-
80 Hertzke, Freeing God’s Children, p. 112.
81 Human Rights Watch. “HRW Background Paper on Slavery and Slavery Redemp-
tion in the Sudan” (1999) [online 10 Jan 2007]; Karl Vick, “Ripping of Slave
‘Redeemers’”, Washington Post, 26 February 2002.
82 Mindy Sink, “Schoolchildren Set Out to Liberate Slaves in Sudan”, New York Times, 2
December 1998; Richard Woodbury, “The Children’s Crusade”, Time Magazine, 21
December 1998.
83 Franklin Graham, “Stand Up for Sudan’s Christians”, letter, Wall Street Journal, 15
March 2000.
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byists of the U.S. evangelicals.84 Richard Cizik is a third example. As
chief lobbyist for the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE), he
had a power base of 30 million members (and potential voters) to use in
his campaigning for Sudan.85 In comparison, the National Rifle Associ-
ation (NRA) has around four million members. The largest non-
governmental organization in the United States, the American Associ-
ation of Retired People (AARP), has 35 million members.86 As noted,
membership is an important indicator of political influence.87
It is important to note that although their organizational basis con-
sisted mainly of evangelical churches, not all faith-based activists were
evangelicals. Nina Shea is a Catholic. And the activist Richard Land and
Richard Cizik consider to be the most central, Michael Horowitz, is a
Jew.88 Horowitz, a former appointee at Reagan’s White House is now
an activist and analyst at the Hudson Institute where he took the initia-
tive for what became the International Religious Freedom Act, and later
spearheaded the evangelical Sudan campaign. His PR initiatives includ-
ed hiring celebrity lawyers like Ken Starr and Johnnie Cochran to de-
fend him in court when he was arrested for protesting outside the
Sudanese embassy.89 Horowitz is not shy about taking credit for his role
in the Sudan campaign: “Debbie and I were behind the peace deal in
Sudan,” he bluntly states.90 Debbie is Deborah Fikes of the Midland
Ministerial Alliance in Texas, who built a grassroots effort for Sudan in
President Bush’s hometown.91 Horowitz attributes his commitment to
persecuted Christians to his Jewish background: “Sudan is the Hitler-
regime of our time,” he says about the Islamist regime.92 Horowitz was
not the only prominent Jewish American who campaigned for Chris-
tians in Sudan. Elliot Abrams, once Assistant Secretary of State under
Reagan, traveled to Sudan to interview Christian refugees as chairman
of the Commission on International Religious Freedom, and in an arti-
cle in The Weekly Standard he outlined how the Bush administration
should approach the crisis.93 One month after the article was printed,
84 Matthew Cooper and Karen Tumulty, “America’s 25 most influential evangelicals”,
Time Magazine, 7 February 2005.
85 Jeffery L. Sheler, Believers. A Journey into Evangelical America (New York: Viking,
2006), pp. 227– 271. Both Land and Cizik were interviewed personally for this study.
86 Numbers taken from the organizations’ web pages in March 2007.
87 Uslaner, “Cracks in the Armour?” p. 358.
88 Richard Land, personal interview with author, 5 February 2007; and Cizik, personal
interview.
89 William Raspberry, “The Am-I-Dreaming Team”, Washington Post, 5 May 2001. The
two were the main stars of two of the most famous legal battles in US history: The
investigation of president Bill Clinton (Starr), and the O.J.Simpson-case (defended by
Cochran).
90 Michael Horowitz, personal interview.
91 George Neumayr, “Midland Ministers to the World”, American Spectator, 12 August
2003.
92 Kate O’Beirne, “A Faraway Country … about which we know a lot – 17 years of civil
war in Sudan”, National Review, 5 March 2001.
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Abrams became one of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice’s
deputies.94 
Another important component in the Christian-conservative cam-
paign for Sudan was to be found at Capitol Hill. The Republican land-
slide election in 1994 had made Congress considerably more religiously
conservative.95 Many of these politicians came to be involved in Sudan.
When a disastrous famine spread across Southern Sudan in 1998, evan-
gelical relief agencies supplied aid to prevent what they considered to be
a “manufactured famine” to exterminate the Sudanese Christians.96 One
of the relief workers who went to Sudan with Samaritan’s Purse in 1998,
was the physician and junior senator from Tennessee, Bill Frist, who five
years later was to become Senate majority leader and one of the most
powerful politicians in the United States. “The radical Islamic regime in
Khartoum is unmatched in its barbarity toward the sub-Saharan or
“black African” Christians of the countries south,” Frist wrote in an op-
ed in The Washington Post upon returning from his trip.97 He called for a
much tougher U.S. policy towards the regime in Khartoum. Frist is the
most prominent example of the Christian-conservative politicians who
began raising the issue of Sudan in Congress from the late 90s onwards.
Apart from him, Allen D. Hertzke’s list of “fervent members of
Congress” includes Senators Sam Brownback (Republican) and Don
Nickles (R); and House Representatives Chris Smith (R), Frank Wolf
(R), Tony Hall (Democrat), Tom Tancredo (R), Joseph Pitts (R) and
Spencer Bachus (R). Eight Republicans and one Democrat, all Christian-
conservatives.98 
By 1999, an organized “Sudan Campaign” had been formed in
Washington D.C. under Nina Shea’s direction at the Freedom House.99
Although largely a “grass top-movement” consisting of elite lobbyists
and activists from faith-based organizations, the campaign also activat-
ed the grassroots of American evangelicalism. From 1996 and on, “In-
93  Elliot Abrams, “What to do about Sudan“, Weekly Standard, 7 May 2001.
94 Abrams was appointed Senior director for democracy, human rights, and interna-
tional operations at the National Security Council. 
95 One measure is the Christian Coalition’s scorecards. In the Congress before 1994, 30
percent of House representatives and 26 percent of the senators voted in line with their
views in at least 80 percent of the votes. After 1994, the numbers were 43 and 36 per-
cent respectively. See Martin, “The Christian Right and American Foreign Policy”.
96 Shea, “A War on Religion”.
97 Bill Frist, “Sudan’s Merciless War on Its own People”, op-ed, Washington Post, 17 July
1998.
98 Hertzke, Freeing God’s Children, appendix. Seven of the nine received a full 100 points
in the Christian Coalition’s scorecard in 2004. Frank Wolf received 84 points and
Tony Hall was not in the House at the time. Pitts and Brownback also co-chaired the
“Values Action Team”, a forum which coordinated strategy between lawmakers and
social-conservative activists. See Peter Stone and Bara Vaida, “Christian Soldiers”,
National Journal, 3 December 2004.
99 The campaign organization still existed in early 2007, but was then directed towards
Darfur.
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ternational Days of Prayer for the Persecuted Church” were organized
annually by the World Evangelical Fellowship (WEF). From a core
group of 7,000 churches, this day of prayer quickly grew to encompass
over 100,000 U.S. churches of all denominations, and ordinary church-
goers would pray for fellow Christians in Sudan and learn about their
plight from the pulpit.100 Director Faith McDonnell of the Church Al-
liance for a New Sudan quotes Representative Frank Wolf who has not-
ed the following about this phenomenon: “There are more churches
than chambers of commerce in the United States. So if you want to in-
fluence foreign policy, you have to influence the churches.”101
News about Sudan also penetrated the religious media. One exam-
ple is the religiously based television series “Touched by an Angel”,
which was one of most popular shows on CBS in the 90s. An entire ep-
isode was aired dedicated to the issue of slavery in Sudan in 1999. Chris-
tian college networks and Christian rock stars also campaigned for
Sudan.102 In August 2001, 30,000 young Christians gathered in Mid-
land, Texas (George W. Bush’s hometown) for the festival “Rock the
Desert”. The following year, 90,000 attended. There they were met by
campaign material such as a mock slave cell to inform them about the
persecution of Christians in Sudan. This event spurred what was later to
become the Midland Ministerial Alliance, which became a central part
of the evangelical Sudan campaign at later stages.103
When the Bush administration came into office in January 2001,
the issue of Christian persecution in Sudan had already been well estab-
lished among evangelicals as a cause worth fighting for. In a survey by
the Ethics and Public Policy Center, more than 70 percent of the 300
pastors, advocates, radio hosts and other members of the “evangelical
elites” who were asked had “heard a lot” about the situation of Chris-
tians in Sudan. More than 40 percent had contributed to an organiza-
tion working for Sudan.104 However, the activists felt they had got
nowhere with the Clinton administration on the issue. According to
Michael Horowitz, Clinton was ”awful on Sudan”.105 The activists were
“struck by the huge disparity between the genocidal scale of atrocities
being committed by the government of Sudan and the muted response
of the President and Secretary of State of the United States,” Nina Shea
said in a testimony before Congress on September 28, 2000 as a repre-
sentative of the International Commission on International Religious
100 Numbers are WEF's own estimate. Taken from their webpage in March 2007.
101 Faith McDonnell, personal interview with author, February 2007.
102 William Lobdell, “Raising Their Voices”, Los Angeles Times, 19 February 2001.
103 Neumayr, “Midland Ministers to the World”.
104 Ethics and Public Policy Center, “Survey of Evangelical Elites” (2002) [12 Jan 2007].
105 Horowitz, personal interview.
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Freedom.106 By the end of the year 2000, the faith-based movement was
ready to take on the new President and his administration on Sudan. 
U.S. policy attention 
Suddenly, Sudan
The premise underlying the thesis of Walter Russell Mead and others
that evangelical pressure directed President Bush’s attention towards
Sudan is that President Clinton did not pay the same level of attention.
Is this true? A search in the The American Presidency Project’s database
for the keyword “Sudan” reveals that President Clinton did mention
Sudan in 12 speeches during his last four-year term in office.107 Thus,
Nina Shea’s claim in The Weekly Standard that President Bush “became
the first president to emphasize the Sudanese conflict in a public
speech“ is obviously not true.108 In fact, the last time Clinton mentioned
Sudan in a public speech – just a few weeks before he left office – he ad-
dressed Shea and her compatriots directly: “[L]et me say especially to
the students, religious communities, and human rights activists who
have done so much to publicize the atrocities of Sudan, America must
continue to press for an end to these egregious practices and make clear
that the Sudanese Government cannot join the community of nations
until fundamental changes are made on these fronts.”109
However, apart from this speech, a closer look at the 11 others
speeches shows that Clinton never actually addressed the conflict in
length until this single occasion, when he was on his way out of office.
On four occasions he mentioned the U.S. bombing of a pharmaceutical
factory in Sudan. In the other seven speeches, Sudan is only mentioned
summarily in sentences like: “War still tears at the heart of Africa.
Congo, Sierra Leone, Angola, Sudan have not yet resolved their con-
flicts.”110 No initiatives were taken by the Clinton administration to
mediate in the conflict between North and South. Clinton did appoint
a special envoy to Sudan in 1999, former congressman Harry Johnston.
But Johnston did not take any new peace initiatives. The administra-
106 Nina Shea, “Progress on Sudan Policy”, Center for Religious Freedom Newsletter, 2000
[12 Jan 2007].
107 The database is located at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and contains all
public papers issued by presidents Clinton and Bush.
108 Nina Shea, “From Sudan to the East River. John Darforth’s unsung service”, Weekly
Standard, 21 June 2004.
109 Bill Clinton, “Remarks on Presenting the Eleanor Roosevelt Award for Human
Rights and the Presidential Medal of Freedom”, 6 December 2000 [online 12 Jan
2007]. 
110 Bill Clinton, “Remarks to the Conference on United States-Africa Partnership for the
21st Century”, 16 March 1999 [online 12 Jan 2007].
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tion’s approach was to isolate rather than engage Khartoum. And al-
though Secretary of State Madeleine Albright did meet with SPLA
commanders and promised them direct aid, no such aid materialized.111
In other words, Sudan seems to have remained a “back-burner issue” for
the Clinton administration, as the faith-based movement has
claimed.112 This is confirmed by observers not affiliated to the faith-
based campaign movement interviewed in Washington D.C. Sudan ex-
pert David Smock at the congressionally founded United States Insti-
tute of Peace (USIP) and Sudan campaign manager at the International
Crisis Group (ICG) Colin Thomas-Jensen both state that there was a
marked shift in policy from the Clinton to the Bush administration.113
Former special envoy for the UN to the Horn of Africa and Norwegian
ambassador Tom Vraalsen states the same in his exposé on the experi-
ences from conflict resolution in Sudan: “In 2001, a fundamental
change occurred in U.S. policy towards the civil war in Sudan. From a
non-interventionist policy, which was mainly limited to condemning
the regime in Khartoum, the United States now moved on to a policy
of constructive engagement”.114
When George W. Bush entered the White House, there were no in-
dications that Sudan would become a higher priority for him than it had
been for his predecessor. In fact, the general impression from Bush’s
election campaign was that he did not have much of a foreign policy at
all, apart from a perception that the country was better off not getting
heavily involved in foreign conflicts.115 When Bush was asked about his
policy on Africa in one of the television debates, he simply answered:
“We don’t have any vital interests there.”116 However, after only four
months in the White House, Bush had already mentioned Sudan on
three different occasions. First, Sudan was mentioned in two speeches in
March 2001 along with China, Cuba and Iraq as countries that deny re-
ligious freedom to their citizens.117 At the same time, Secretary of State
Colin Powell, at his first hearing before the House Committee on Inter-
national Relations stated that “there is perhaps no greater tragedy on
111 Connell, “Sudan. Recasting U.S. Policy”: 2.
112 According to the Sudan Campaign, the term “back-burner” even figured in a policy
paper on Sudan from the Clinton administration. “About the Sudan Campaign”,
background document, 2000 (Freedom House [online 24 Nov 2007]).
113 David Smock, personal interview with author, 6 February 2007; Colin Thomas-
Jensen, personal interview with author, 6 February 2007.
114 Tom Vraalsen, “Erfaringer fra konfliktløsning i Afrika: En vurdering av resultater og
virkninger – tilfellet Sudan” [Experiences from conflict resolution in Africa: An
assessment of results and consequences in the case of Sudan], Internasjonal Politikk,
vol. 63, no. 1 (2005): 75–88. Quote on p. 79, my translation.
115 Svein Melby, Bush-revolusjonen i amerikansk utenrikspolitikk [The Bush revolution in US
foreign policy], (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2004), pp. 9–16.
116 Princeton N. Lyman, “A Strategic Approach to Terrorism”, in Africa – US Relations.
Strategic Encounters, eds Donald Rotchild and Edmond J. Keller (London: Lynne Rien-
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the face of the Earth today than the tragedy that is unfolding in the
Sudan”.118 Powell promised the country would be a top priority for him.
This prompted The Washington Post to write a story entitled “Suddenly,
Sudan”; and then, two weeks later the cover story “Christians’ Plight in
Sudan Tests a Bush Stance” was written, pointing out the contrast be-
tween this rhetoric and the lack of attention to foreign policy, and espe-
cially to Africa, before the election.119 
Then, in a speech to the American Jewish Committee on May 3 –
with Shimon Peres, Joschka Fisher and Vicente Fox as guests – Bush de-
voted three full paragraphs to the civil war in Sudan: “We must turn the
eyes of the world upon the atrocities in the Sudan,” Bush stated, and an-
nounced that he had appointed U.S. AID Chief Andrew Natsios as a spe-
cial humanitarian coordinator to Sudan. “Our actions begin today, and
my administration will continue to speak and act for as long as the per-
secution and atrocities in the Sudan last,” the President concluded.120 
During the summer of 2001, a Sudan policy review was under way
in the State Department. And by September 6, 2001, Bush’s actions
had led him to appoint long-time senator and Episcopalian priest John
Danforth as “Special Envoy for Peace to The Sudan”. Danforth was
given a considerable number of staff with a full-time presence at the
peace negotiations in Kenya.121 He was also given a specific mission to
end the country’s civil war: “Our administration is deeply committed
– is deeply committed – to bringing good folks together, from within
our country and the leadership of other nations, to get this issue solved
once and for all,” Bush stated at the ceremony in the Rose Garden.122
What explains this sudden willingness to get involved in this then 18-
year old and complicated civil war in a continent far away? 
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Evangelical pressure
Media and observers by and large explained Bush’s involvement in
Sudan as a result of pressure from evangelical lobby groups. “The Bush
administration, prodded in part by American Christian evangelical
groups, (…) has taken an unusual interest in the Sudan civil war,” The
New York Times stated.123 “Bush officials have been lobbied heavily by
fundamentalist Christian groups,” The Washington Post explained.124
“The conservative religious lobby in the U.S. (…) pressured the U.S.
government to maintain a harder line on Sudan,” Human Rights Watch
concluded in one of its analyses.125 There are, however, other possible
explanations why Sudan suddenly caught the Bush administration’s at-
tention. I will turn to these soon. But first: how plausible is the estab-
lished thesis that Bush’s involvement in Sudan was a result of faith-
based pressure?
One indication that faith is involved is found in Bush’s own rhetoric
on Sudan. The first two times Bush mentioned Sudan, he did it as an
example of religious persecution (whereas Clinton talked about the civil
war without mentioning religion). When Bush appointed John
Danforth, Bush did not mention religious persecution. He did, how-
ever, mention the slavery issue. And as he explained his motivation for
intervening, he seemed to be addressing organizations like Billy
Graham’s Samaritan’s Purse directly: “We’re committed to bringing
stability to the Sudan, so that many loving Americans, nongovernmen-
tal organizations, will be able to perform their duties of love and com-
passion within that country without fear of reprisal.”126
The appointments of Andrew Natsios and John Danforth as special
envoys can in themselves be interpreted as gestures towards the faith-
based movement. The appointments were made in spite of the new Sec-
retary of State Colin Powell’s initial wish to scale back on the use of spe-
cial envoys.127 Natsios’ previous job was as director of WorldVision, one
of the Christian relief organizations involved in the campaign. Danforth
was an ordained minister, and this appointment went down well with
the evangelicals.128 In fact, the Bush administration’s first choice as spe-
cial envoy had been Chester Crocker, U.S. Secretary of State for African
Affairs in the Reagan administration. But members of the Sudan coali-
tion claim their pressure ensured that Crocker was not appointed. “We
123 Steven R. Weisman, “Powell Tries to Nudge Sudan Toward Peace”, New York Times,
22 October 2003.
124 Karl Vick, “Powell Calls for Reconciliation in Sudan”, Washington Post, 27 May 2001.
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fought pretty hard against Crocker,” states Faith McDonnell of the
Church Alliance for a New Sudan.129 Crocker was one of the architects
behind the “constructive engagement” policy with apartheid South
Africa in the 1980s and did not have the trust of the religious conserva-
tives. In the end, Crocker turned the job down himself as he realized he
would not be able to get sufficient guarantees that religious conserva-
tives would not interfere in his work.130 Danforth himself was in no
doubt as to who were the main forces behind Bush’s Sudan policy:
“[T]he energy fueling our effort in Sudan was clear to me when I saw
the Christian leaders in the audience that day [when Danforth was ap-
pointed as envoy in the Rose Garden] and when I considered the reli-
gious convictions of President Bush. American Christians wanted our
government to make every effort to end the world’s longest lasting civil
war,” he writes in his autobiography.131 
Franklin Graham’s position as one of President Bush’s religious
mentors indicates one of the most crucial factor behind the apparent
success of the faith-based campaign – elite access. As noted earlier, di-
rect access to Representatives is crucial, since the Representatives may
act as individual entrepreneurs in law-making.132 But in foreign-policy
matters, the “Entrepreneur-in-Chief” is undoubtedly the President.133
According to The New York Times, Graham has himself said he used a
breakfast with Bush one week before the election to pressure the soon
to be President on the need for American involvement in Sudan.134
Shortly after Bush took office, a delegation of religious leaders was sum-
moned to meet with Bush’s principal advisor Karl Rove for an hour-
long discussion of Sudan.135 Among the leaders was Charles Colson of
the Wilberforce Forum. He is said to be a personal friend of President
Bush, and is one of the evangelical leaders who later were to have weekly
conference calls with Karl Rove and Bush’s liaison with the evangelical
community, Tim Goeglein, to discuss policy initiatives.136 Another is
Richard Land of the Southern Baptist Convention. According to him,
128 Hertzke, Freeing God’s Children, p. 289. Danforth is, however, a self-proclaimed reli-
gious moderate, and in 2005 he wrote a sharp critique of the Christian Right, which
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the Pulpit”, Washington Post, 2 February 2006. 
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132 Crabb et.al., Congress and the Foreign Policy Process, p. 141.
133 Hence criterion ten: direct access to the executive.
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“there’s no question this is the most receptive White House to our con-
cerns and to our perspective of any White House that I’ve dealt with,
and I’ve dealt with every White House from Reagan on.”137 Other ac-
tivists share this impression: “We tried to reach Clinton, but did not get
much response. He had a firewall around him that did not let us in that
much,” Faith McDonnell stated.138 
But having access does not imply getting everything your own way.
“It’s not like the Bush administration did everything evangelicals want-
ed, not by a long shot,” William Saunders at the Family Research Coun-
cil underlines.139 He founded the organization Sudan Relief Inc. to
campaign for Sudan. But Bush’s White House does nevertheless seem
to have been more receptive to evangelical groups than previous admin-
istrations.140 One reason may be that the Bush administration itself was
full of evangelicals. According to presidential historian Garry Scott
Smith, there have never been as many conservative Christians in the
White House as under George W. Bush.141 One of them was Michael
Gerson, who was Bush’s principal speechwriter at the time the Presi-
dent made the speeches in which Sudan was mentioned. “During my
time in the White House, the most intense and urgent evangelical ac-
tivism I saw did not come on the expected values issues—though abor-
tion and the traditional family weren’t ignored— but on genocide,
global AIDS and human trafficking. The most common request I re-
ceived was, ‘We need to meet with the president on Sudan’ – not on gay
marriage,” Gerson writes in a commentary in Newsweek.142
Elite access was also secured through the recruitment of the new ad-
ministration. I have already mentioned Elliot Abrams as one Sudan-
advocate who secured a post in the Bush administration. Michael Miller
is another. He also secured a job in the National Security Council. Be-
fore that, he had been Senator Bill Frist’s assistant, and traveled with
Frist to Sudan.143 Frist himself was “Bush’s main man in the Senate and
sees the president all the time,” according to The Washington Post.144 It
also seems probable that Frist and other Christian-conservatives in Con-
gress who had campaigned for deeper involvement in Sudan all had
137 Richard Land, interview, Frontline/The Jesus Factor, Public Broadcasting Service, 18
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greater access to the Bush administration than they had to the Clinton
administration.145 
Another argument is organizational strength. Although largely a
“grass tops movement”, the faith-based lobbyists gained strength and
legitimacy from their grassroots support in the evangelical community.
As described in the introductory chapter, evangelicals have come to
constitute a very important subgroup in American society in terms of
numbers. “When you get 100,000 churches focused on this, they begin
to talk to their congressmen,” Richard Land says about the Sudan cam-
paign.146 One example of how this grassroots power worked is the in-
volvement in Sudan of Tom Tancredo. He came into Congress in 1999
from the district in Colorado where schoolchildren had drawn national
attention for raising 50,000 dollars for slave-redemption in Sudan.147 
Just as important as numerical strength is probably the evangeli-
cals’ organizational strength: “Religious conservatives have created the
largest, best-organized grassroots social movement of the last quarter
century,” Harvard Professor of public policy Robert D. Putnam writes
in Bowling Alone, his study of the development of civil engagement in
the States since the 1960s.148 According to Putnam, “faith communi-
ties are arguably the single most important repository of social capital
in America.”149 Churches are among the arenas where most Americans
meet most often, not only to pray but also to discuss and learn about
social issues. And whereas overall church attendance has dropped
somewhat since its peak in the early 1960s – along with overall civic
engagement, evangelical activism provides one of the counter-trends of
increased activism. This means that the relative numerical and organi-
zational power of evangelicals has increased considerably over the past
decades. This is evident in their voting power: in 2004, self-professed
born-again Christians constituted 40 percent of George W. Bush’s
electorate. If one also includes the votes of Catholic traditionalists and
145 The elite access-argument seems further strengthened when one considers the signa-
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Mormons, then Bush received 60 percent of his vote from religious
conservatives.150 Finally, strengthened organizational and voting pow-
er also means strengthened lobbying power: one indicator is the polls
conducted by The National Journal on perceived lobby strength in Con-
gress. In 2005, representatives were asked the question “which special
interest group would members of your party buck more often if the
group wasn’t so powerful?” Christian-conservatives came second
among Republicans, beaten only by the National Rifle Association.151 
One final argument in the explanation for evangelical pressure is
the breadth of the Sudan coalition. Although grassroots activity was
largely confined to evangelical groups, the elite coalition was much
broader, encompassing Jews, Catholics and secular activists. Allen D.
Hertzke calls it an “unlikely alliance for human rights.”152 Michael
Horowitz cites gaining left-right support as one of the main principles
of his lobbying strategy.153 But the most unlikely factor in the Sudan
coalition was the bridging between religious groups with centuries-
long antagonisms. Historically, Protestants and Catholics have not been
natural bedfellows in American politics; neither have evangelicals and
Jews in modern times. The fact that the campaigns for religious free-
dom and Sudan seem to have contributed to a diminishment of old
theological tensions may be one of the movements’ main strengths.
“American evangelicals and orthodox Jews appear set to write a new and
original chapter in the long and troubled story of relations between the
faiths. Their alliance could well be deeper and more stable than many
observers believe,” Walter Russell Mead predicts.154
In the case of Sudan, this new alliance is evident in the campaigning
of Jews like Michael Horowitz and Elliot Abrams, which I have already
described. Other examples are the involvement of Elie Wiesel, who was
among the people who wrote to President Clinton about “how the geno-
cide in Sudan haunted him”; and the long Sudan activism of Rabbi
David Saperstein of the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism
(RAC).155 Yet another is the fact that the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Mu-
seum made the plight of Southern Sudan the first exhibit mounted by
149 Ibid., p. 66.
150 Smith, Faith and the Presidency, p. 376.
151 Bara Vaida, “Special Report: Congressional and Political Insiders Poll”, National Jour-
nal, 11 November 2005.
152 The subtitle of his book Freeing God’s Children. Crabb et.al. Congress and the Foreign
Policy Process, p. 144, call it “strange bedfellows” (criterion nine).
153 Horowitz, personal interview.
154 Mead, Power, Terror, Peace and War, p. 92. In a personal interview, expert on the rela-
tionship between religion and politics John C. Green at Pew Forum, however claims
that “alliance is too strong a word” to describe the relationship between Jews and
evangelicals. In his opinion, Israel is about the only issue that unites the two groups.
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its then newly founded “Committee of Conscience”. Among the partic-
ipants at a meeting about Sudan organized by the museum in February
2001 were the American Civil Liberties Union and several Catholic
bishops.156 The U.S. Catholic Conference condemned the “cruel, fratri-
cidal conflict in Sudan” in 2000 and sent a delegation to the country led
by Cardinal Bernhard Law.157 
Alternative explanations
Present at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in February 2001
were also representatives of the Congressional Black Caucus, the orga-
nization representing African-American members of Congress. One
might assume that the longest civil war in Africa would be just as big
a concern for the African-American communities as for the predomi-
nantly white evangelicals; and activism by African-American lobbyists
is one of several alternative explanations for the Bush administration’s
involvement in Sudan. Others include pressure from other human-
rights lobby groups; and the possibility that foreign policy is in this
case not at all best explained as a result of domestic lobbying, but rather
as a product of the President’s personal convictions, or of economic or
security interests. These four possible explanations will be explored in
this section. 
African-American lobbying
“The lesson should be to involve more organizations in the fight against
the Sudanese genocide. Where are the organizations of African Ameri-
cans in this campaign? Why are they not crying out about African ho-
locausts?” one commentator asked after having attended a press
conference of the Sudan campaign at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Mu-
seum, just a few months before a large meeting where African-
American groups were heavily represented.158 Although there had been
African-American voices speaking up for Sudan in the United States
since the early 1990s, a review of academic literature, reports and arti-
cles in the press strongly suggests that the African-American commu-
nity was not a main force in the domestic lobbying campaign for Sudan.
They were however to become an important part of the campaign initi-
ated by Christian-conservatives, and this may help explain why this
campaign became such a persuasive force. 
156 Mufson, “Bush Urged to Champion Human Rights”.
157 United States Office of Catholic Bishops, “Sudan’s Cry for Peace”, Policy statement, 14
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Furthermore, there were few voices from Sudanese exiles in the de-
bate on Sudan. There were some, but as a whole white American voices
dominated. One reason may be that there is no coherent Sudanese-
American society in the States. Sudanese migration to the U.S. is a rel-
atively new phenomenon; almost all Sudanese have arrived since the late
1980s onward, and up until around the year 2000, annual numbers
were still in their hundreds.159 Which means the assumption that an
ethnic group must retain ties to its “old country” to be motivated into
action is probably not met.160 This assumption in fact seems to be a
more fitting description of the ties between missionaries in Sudan and
their “brothers and sisters” in the United States. The missionaries had
both strong emotional ties to Sudan as well as a strong organizational
network in the United States. One group of exiles is worth mentioning,
however: the lost boys of Sudan. These were a group of around 3,600
young boys who had lived in a refugee camp in Kenya for several years
after having fled the war in Sudan. In 2001 they were allowed to resettle
in the States, and their stories received broad media coverage. Secretary
of State Colin Powell met several of the boys personally in June 2001,
as the review of Bush’s Sudan policy was underway.161 “To act you must
get to know those you act on behalf of. You must have a personal stake
in it. The lost boys did a lot to move people into action,” Faith McDon-
nell states.162 She has worked with several of the lost boys. 
According to Human Rights Watch, the U.S. African community
was split on the Sudan issue until Louis Farrakhan “faded out of the de-
bate” due to illness in the late 1990s.163 Farrakhan, head of the organi-
zation “Nation of Islam”, was a strong defender of the Islamist
government in Khartoum, and had considerable clout in the debate on
the issue among African-American organizations. Allen D. Hertzke
suggests black leaders like Jesse Jackson remained silent on Sudan for
fear of offending Muslim allies.164 The fact that the Sudan had become
a “Christian Right issue” also made it difficult for African-American or-
ganizations to join the campaign. African-Americans are no less reli-
gious than white Americans, but there are deep historical splits between
white and black churches. According to an expert on religion and poli-
tics, John Green, at Pew Forum, “one of the biggest divisions in Amer-
ican religion is on race. Many researchers like to think of black churches
as a separate religious tradition, even though the theology is the same.
159 Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf, Wanderings: Sudanese Migrants and Exiles in North America
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 6–9.
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Many evangelicals have worked very hard to disavow racism, but the di-
visions are still there.”165 
“In the early phases of the Sudan campaign black support was lim-
ited to disparate leaders,” Hertzke writes.166 Among these disparate
leaders was Congressman Donald Payne (Democrat from New Jersey).
He was among the activists arrested in a protest outside the Sudanese
embassy in the spring of 2001, and he later introduced the final version
of the Sudan Peace Act in Congress.167 In 2001, Al Sharpton and Jesse
Jackson, previous presidential contenders, made trips to Sudan. At this
point, Sudan had become a hot topic among African-Americans as well.
“This has the possibility of becoming a new South-Africa”, one staffer
for a black Congressman told the newsletter Africa Confidential.168
Chuck Singleton, pastor of the largest African-American congregation
in California was another leader on the issue. In 1999, he explained that
the lack of attention to Sudan from black leaders was due to their being
too busy with other issues. “So to call their attention to and get them to
change directions or add another agenda item is a very difficult thing to
do,” Singleton said.169
In early 2001, Sudan activists like Payne and Singleton did succeed
in bringing elite organizations like the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Urban League, and the
Congressional Black Caucus into the faith-based campaign network for
Sudan. This added considerable strength to the campaign.170
Human-rights group lobbying
Christian-conservatives were by no means the first to introduce Sudan as
an issue to U.S. civil society. But they seem to have been just about the
first to highlight the religious dimension of the civil war in Sudan. Hu-
man Rights Watch (HRW) had issued a report on the Christian Coptic
minority years before Sudan entered the Christian-conservative radar
screen.171 Ever since the seizure of power by the Islamists in Khartoum
in 1989, HRW had issued regular reports on the civil war in Sudan. But
apart from the report on the Copts, only one other underlined specifical-
165 Green, personal interview.
166 Hertzke, Freeing God’s Children, p. 253.
167 Barbara Reynolds, “Making a Stand against Slavery”, Washington Post, 15 July 2001.
168 “U.S. – Sudan – Caution, lobbies at work”, Africa Confidential.
169 Tom Bearden, “Crisis in Sudan”, interview by Jim Lehrer, Jim Lehrer/Newshour, Public
Broadcasting Service, 31 May 1999 (PBS [online 24 Jan 2007]).
170 This seems to underline religious historian Leo P. Ribuffo’s point that “religious
interest groups have been most effective when they found allies outside their own
communities and invoked widely shared American values.” Ribuffo, “Religion in the
History of US Foreign Policy”, p. 21. Which again resonates with criteria three and
nine: Policies ought to be backed by the larger public, and the lobbyists need to have
the ability to build broad coalitions.
171 Human Rights Watch, The Copts: Passive Survivors Under Threat (Washington DC:
Human Rights Watch, 1993).
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ly the religious aspects of the conflict.172 The same goes for Amnesty In-
ternational. Their annual reports document massive human-rights
abuses, including the mass killings of civilians in Southern Sudan
throughout the 1990s. But a review of all of their annual reports since
1995 indicates that the conflict is not framed as a religious struggle, or
as the genocide of Christians. An electronic search through the reports
shows that abbreviations of the word “Christian” are mentioned only
once in eleven reports (in a description of an episode inside a Church in
2002). The word “religious” is mentioned three times, but not as a de-
scription of the conflict.173 Neither do the traditional, mainline denom-
inations seem to have played any significant role in getting Sudan on the
map of U.S. concerns. “Sudan has been a frustration. We have not put
enough energy into it, and I don’t think we have been as persistent and
public as the crisis demanded,” presiding Bishop Mark S. Hanson of the
Evangelical Lutheran Church of America (ECLA) admits.174 
These arguments all support the claim of the Christian-conservative
activists that an emphasis on the religious elements of the conflict was
lacking.175 Says William Saunders of the Family Research Council:
“Very, very few knew about Sudan in the mid-90s. We were concerned
that mainstream human rights groups did not pay sufficient attention
because of the religious element of the conflict.”176
The framing of the civil war in Sudan in religious terms might be
one explanation why the religiously conservative campaign caught the
attention of the Bush administration. Another might be that theirs was
a campaign in a more profound sense of the word than the activity of tra-
ditional groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty. Although
these last groups were concerned about abuses in Sudan as well, neither
of them made Sudan a special priority over other countries with similar
abuses. In fact, Human Rights Watch’s executive director Kenneth
Roth had criticized the faith-based campaign against religious persecu-
tion in the 1990s as “special pleading” and “an effort to privilege certain
classes of victims”.177 This enraged campaign strategist Michael
Horowitz, who tried to get Roth fired by sending letters to board mem-
bers of HRW and stepping up public criticism of Roth. There were, in
other words, both personal and political antagonisms making it hard for
liberal and faith-based activists to cooperate on Sudan. 
172 Human Rights Watch, “In the Name of God”, Human Rights Watch Report, vol. 6, no.
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Reading through op-eds in major newspapers and academic litera-
ture on American Sudan policy made it clear that public campaigning
for Sudan in the late 90s was largely conducted by faith-based groups,
not the traditional secular human-rights groups. Personal interviews
confirmed this impression. David Smock at the U.S. Institute of Peace
and Colin Thomas-Jensen at the International Crisis Group both
worked closely with Sudan in the late 90s for secular groups. Both
mention religious conservatives as the main reason why the Bush ad-
ministration got involved in Sudan. According to Thomas Jensen,
“Bush came under pressure from his base.”178 Smock calls evangelicals
“Bush’s natural constituency – and he listened to them.”179 This might
also have a structural explanation: although rich in topical and political
expertise, organizations like HRW and Amnesty do not have the same
organizational grassroots strength as evangelical groups. Amnesty In-
ternational USA represents 300,000 members, while the National
Association of Evangelicals represents 30 million.180 Furthermore,
while evangelicals according to Robert Putnam have built up some of
the strongest grassroots movements in the United States over the past
few decades, organizations like Amnesty have developed from grass-
roots organizations into “participation-by-proxy” organizations, where
the links between paid activists in Washington D.C. and paying mem-
bers are increasingly weak.181
Nevertheless, four secular initiatives for Sudan do need mentioning
to paint a complete picture of Sudan activism in the United States
around 2000–01: first, at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), a “Task Force on U.S.-Sudan Policy” was established in
July 2000 to “revitalize” the debate on Sudan in the U.S. and generate
“pragmatic recommendations for the new administration.182 This task
force was in part a reaction to the strong Sudan activism of U.S. evangel-
icals and others. People like Walter H. Kansteiner III, who was to be-
come Undersecretary of State for African Affairs in the Bush
administration, and Elliott Abrams participated in the task force, and its
recommendations were to be influential on the new administration.183
Secondly, similar activities had been ongoing at the U.S. Institute of
Peace (USIP) throughout the 1990s, under the auspices of Chester A.
Crocker, who was President Bush’s first choice as special envoy to Sudan
in 2001, but who turned down the job.184 The report “A new Approach
178 Thomas-Jensen, personal interview.
179 Smock, personal interview.
180 Numbers taken from the organizations’ web pages.
181 Putnam, Bowling Alone, p. 159.
182 Center for Strategic and International Studies, U.S. Policy to End Sudan’s War, p. 1.
183 The influence of these institutions will be discussed further in the analysis of US pol-
icy towards Sudan.
184 Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa, p. 120.
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to Peace in Sudan” triggered a State Department conference at which
ideas for renewed involvement were discussed.185 Thirdly, a “Sudan
Working Group” was established, which consisted of several liberal
church groups and which cooperated closely with Human Rights Watch
and Amnesty International. This group also produced several policy pa-
pers on Sudan and wrote letters to the Clinton administration. And last-
ly, the International Crisis Group continuously campaigned on Sudan,
particularly through its Africa expert John Prendergast, who also worked
on Sudan in the State Department during the Clinton administration. 
Result of personal convictions
So far, the entire analysis has rested on the assumption that domestic
policy concerns influence foreign-policy decisions. Although not an un-
common assumption, neither is it an uncontroversial one. It is difficult
to prove a causal relationship between the actions of domestic lobby
groups and foreign-policy decision-makers. Another question is wheth-
er these relations are best described as causal. An increasing corpus of
scholarly works investigates foreign-policy decisions in terms of so-
called constitutive relations rather than causal ones.186 Within these
various social-constructivist perspectives, the main argument is that de-
cisions must be considered in light of the decision-makers’ identity:
how they view reality. Instead of speaking of Christian-conservative
lobbying, one may speak of a Christian-conservative discourse, which is
part of the constitution of the decision-makers’ worldview.187 
The vast majority of the works dealing with religion and foreign
policy-making in the Bush administration seem to be drawing to vari-
ous degrees on this theoretical perspective, even though few of the au-
thors label themselves constructivists or discuss constructivist theory
directly.188 Instead of discussing the causal influence on religious ideas
and interest groups, their primary interest is to look at President Bush’s
personal faith as an explanation for his actions.189 One example is
Andrew J. Bacevich and Elizabeth H. Prodromou’s article “God is Not
Neutral: Religion and Foreign Policy after 9/11”, which opens with the
following statement: “George W. Bush is a man of genuine religious
conviction. Since September 11, 2001, his personal religiosity has had
185 Ibid.; and United States Institute of Peace, A new Approach to Peace in Sudan (Wash-
ington: USIP, 1999). 
186 John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism
and the Social Constructivist Challenge”, International Organization, vol. 52, no. 4
(1998).
187 Susanne Scholz, “The Christian Right’s Discourse on Gender and the Bible”, Journal
of Feminist Studies in Religion, vol. 21, no. 1 (2005): 81–100.
188 Instead of using the language of social constructivism, one may use the language of
political psychologists and speak of belief systems and operational codes, this study
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a marked effect on U.S. foreign policy.”190 Their conclusion is that the
President’s religion informed his alliance with neo-conservative think-
ers and “may well ensure the dominance of neoconservative precepts in
U.S. foreign policy for the foreseeable future.”191 Another widespread
conclusion is that Bush’s personal faith infuses him with certitude, not
to say stubbornness, when pursuing his personal goals. “He truly be-
lieves he’s on a mission from God. Absolute faith like that overwhelms
a need for analysis”, Republican columnist Bruce Bartlett claims in Ron
Suskind’s analysis entitled “Without a Doubt”.192
It is no wonder Bush’s personal faith fascinates journalists and re-
searchers. His own speeches and remarks are full of references to the
United States being “called” or given a “mission” by the “Author of Lib-
erty” or “Maker of Heaven”. As are speeches of every American presi-
dent throughout all times. Abraham Lincoln spoke of being “a humble
instrument in the hands of the Almighty, and of this his almost chosen
people”; and Franklin D. Roosevelt declared during World War II that
“we on our side are striving to be true to [our] divine heritage.”193 This
makes it difficult to draw a strong conclusion about the influence of
Bush’s personal faith by reading his speeches. He is perhaps not as much
exposing his personal faith as continuing a rhetorical tradition as old as
the Republic. And even if personal faith does affect Bush’s foreign pol-
icy, this faith is not an intrinsic force in Bush’s mind alone. Whether
the relationship is causal or constitutive, there seems to be a strong ar-
gument that the implementation of Bush’s faith is influenced by groups
with whom he shares a basic religious worldview and whom he consid-
ers to be close allies and even personal friends. “Due to personal connec-
tions he had, Bush became personally interested in the issue [of
Sudan],” Faith McDonnell believes.194 According to campaign leader
Nina Shea, the President’s wife Laura also expressed a personal interest
in Sudan when Shea was talking to the President about the issue at a
White House event in 2002. Shea later learned that Laura Bush’s moth-
er had attended several meetings about Sudan at her church in Midland,
which was one of the most active on the issue.195 Special Envoy John
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Danforth has said that “not only did the President appoint me as special
envoy, he repeatedly talked to me about Sudan afterwards. Every single
time I went to either Sudan or Kenya for peace talks, I talked to the
President in advance, either in the Oval Office or by telephone – every
time. He was intimately involved in it.”196 In his autobiography,
Danforth suggests that Bush had a specific motivation for engaging in
Sudan: “President Bush saw the prospect of peace in Sudan as a possible
model for resolving ethnic and religious conflicts in the Middle East
and elsewhere. As the president once said to me, ‘If they [the Sudanese]
can figure it out, anyone can’”.197 
Yet another explanation is that Bush acted out of what may be
called a “never-again” instinct. The phrase “never again” has strong res-
onance in what may be called America’s “culture of Holocaust aware-
ness.”198 American politicians react forcefully on a rhetorical level when
hearing the word genocide. But this culture does not seem to have
spurred the United States into acting forcefully against genocide at any
time during the twentieth century.199 
National interest
Classic realism, the belief that countries are driven by interest and the
quest for power rather than by ideals and benevolence, is according to
Walter Russell Mead a foreign-policy model designed to describe the
European power-play in the nineteenth century, and as such is no fruit-
ful starting point for a study of American foreign policy.200 Neverthe-
less, whether labeled realism or Hamiltonianism (as Mead calls it),
interests matter, and to understand U.S. policies towards Sudan – in-
cluding the decision to work for a peace agreement – one needs to con-
sider U.S. interests in Sudan. After all, the most important criterion for
lobbying influence on foreign policy, is perhaps whether the issue
pushed for is in line with U.S. strategic interests or not.201 
Sudan has never been a country of great national interest to the Unit-
ed States, either economically or strategically. At the time President
Bush came into office, there were, however, two areas where Sudan was
of some economic interest to interest groups in the United States: gum
Arabic and oil. Gum Arabic is a derivative of the acacia tree, a natural
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substance which is required in the production of newspapers (in print-
ers), soft drinks (like Coca Cola) and pharmaceuticals. Sudan provides 70
to 90 percent of the world’s supply; and in the 1990s, the United States
imported almost all of its gum Arabic from the country.202 When trade
sanctions were imposed on Sudan in 1997, an exception was made for
gum Arabic after lobbying from groups like the Newspaper Association
of America (representing among others The Washington Post), the Nation-
al Soft Drink Association (Coca Cola etc.), the National Food Processors
Association, and the Nonprescription Drug Manufacturers
Association.203 These lobbies’ interests diverged from those of the faith-
based activists. While conservative Christians wanted to isolate Khar-
toum (“the Hitler regime of our time”), the gum Arabic lobby wanted a
better relationship with the regime. This conflict played a role when
Congress later discussed strengthening the sanctions against Khartoum.
But it seems unlikely that the need for gum Arabic was a barrier to get-
ting more deeply involved in the peace process in Sudan. Quite the op-
posite: a more stable situation in Sudan was also in the interest of the soft
drink and printing industry in the U.S., and the need for gum Arabic
does not seem to have played any role in the discussion on whether the
U.S. should involve itself in a peace process. 
Another economic interest was soon to become much more impor-
tant than gum Arabic: oil. Large quantities of oil were found in the
south of Sudan in the early 1990s, and this was probably one main rea-
son why the civil war escalated at the same time.204 The regime in Khar-
toum seized control over the oil fields and cut deals with Western and
Asian firms, mainly from Australia, Malaysia, China and Canada, to ex-
tract the oil. No U.S. companies were directly involved in this new oil
boom, but U.S. investors were involved in several of the companies.205
As with the gum Arabic lobby, these companies lobbied for the United
States to improve its relationship with Khartoum. An argument could
therefore be made that the United States had a strategic interest in fa-
voring Khartoum over the South in order to gain access to the potential
oil riches in Sudan, and that engaging in a peace process that could
strengthen the South would endanger American interests206. This argu-
ment is, however, weakened by the fact that the oil discoveries in Sudan
were small compared to other oil riches on the African continent. In
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1999, Sudan’s known reserves were ranked only tenth among African
countries, and the reserves of 36 million tons were dwarfed by Libya’s
3,900 and Nigeria’s 3,000 million tons.207 Furthermore, an argument
could also be made that to secure future oil revenues, it would be in the
interest of both Khartoum and the United States to stabilize the situa-
tion in the oil-producing areas on the border between the North and the
South in order to bring in new investments and explore new areas208. A
peace deal could be seen as being in the strategic interest of the U.S. in
order to secure future oil supplies. 
Economic interest in gum Arabic and oil seem to be more impor-
tant in the discussion of the substance of U.S. policy towards Sudan –
especially in Congress – not in the discussion of whether the Bush ad-
ministration should get involved in brokering a peace agreement in the
first place. None of the people I interviewed mentioned oil or gum Ar-
abic as part of the initial policy rationale behind the Bush administra-
tion’s Sudan policy. The same conclusion seems fair if one looks at U.S.
security interests in Sudan. These were mainly concentrated around the
issue of terrorism, which seems to have been the main force behind U.S.
policy towards Sudan since the Cold War. In the 1990s, the U.S. im-
posed sanctions on Sudan, barred the country from entering the UN Se-
curity Council, and even bombed Sudan as a part of its counter-terrorist
policies. In general, terrorism seems to have been the guiding principle
behind the strategic views on Africa of the Bush administration as well.
A policy document from the White House states, “In Africa, promise
and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate pover-
ty. This threatens both a core value of the United States — preserving
human dignity — and our strategic priority — combating global terror.”209
Nevertheless, it is hard to find any indications in early statements from
the Bush administration that engaging in the peace process in Sudan
was considered a part of a strategy against terrorism. When asked about
Africa in his first hearing at the House International Relations Com-
mittee, Colin Powell stated that “Africa would be a priority for Presi-
dent Bush and me; not necessarily a military or national security
priority, but just a priority in the sense that this is a continent of
800,000,000 people who have great needs, and those needs can be sat-
isfied in many ways by United States action and United States effort”.210
David Smock at the USIP makes a similar point: “Counter-terrorism
was not a driving force behind policies in Sudan. It is clearly very much
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Energy Council, 2001) [online 12 Dec 2007].
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the driving force behind recent policies in Somalia, but this was not the
case for Sudan.”211
Engaging more deeply in Sudan was perhaps not important to U.S.
strategic interests in 2001. But on the other hand it is hard to see that
working for peace would be against strategic interests. The conclusion
of the CSIS task force in February 2001 was that the approach of the
Clinton administration – isolation of Khartoum combined with tough
rhetoric – had made little headway in stopping Khartoum’s support of
international terrorism. “If the Bush administration is to be effective in
advancing U.S. interests in Sudan, it will need a significantly modified
approach,” the task force recommended.212 One could therefore argue
that there was little risk in engaging in peacekeeping in 2001. In fact,
changes on the ground made conditions look “ripe for resolution” as the
Bush administration reviewed its policies in the summer of 2001.213
These conditions were first of all the military situation; the fact that
neither side in the civil war seemed capable of a military victory. This
was matched by a lack of any political advance on either side, which
made the leaderships weaker both in North and South. At the same
time, the repeated attempts to produce a peace settlement in the past
had created some common ground from which to launch a new diplo-
matic offensive. Finally, the regime in Khartoum had approached
Washington D.C. several times and offered terrorist intelligence in the
final years of the Clinton administration. Although this did not change
official U.S. policy towards Sudan, American agents made their first vis-
it to Khartoum to exchange material in May 2000. 
All of this meant that the climate in Washington had been chang-
ing even before the arrival of the Bush administration, and when Colin
Powell ordered a review of Sudan policy in the spring of 2001, both of-
ficials in the State Department and policy advisors were positive to a
deeper engagement for peace. 
U.S. policy substance
Drawing someone’s attention to an issue is just the first step on the way
to influencing his or her position. This section examines the content of
United States policies towards Sudan from the summer of 2001, when
the Bush administration’s new policy was presented, up until January
2005, when a peace agreement was signed between the government in
Khartoum and the Southern rebels. To what degree did the Bush ad-
ministration follow the policy recommendations of religious conserva-
211 Smock, personal interview.
212 Center for Strategic and International Studies, U.S. Policy to End Sudan’s War, p. 5.
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tives? And secondly, to what degree did Congress adopt the policy
recommendations of these groups, and did the input of Congress influ-
ence the administration’s policies? Establishing such links, if there are
any, does not imply proving a causal relationship between the policy in-
puts of pressure groups and the administration’s policies. But if there is
little or no correlation, there could hardly be any influence in terms of
policy substance.
Executive policies 
To determine what religious conservative pressure groups wanted Bush
to do in Sudan is not entirely straightforward. Religious conservatives
were not a monolithic group. Plenty of recommendations were made by
plenty of people. But as this analysis has tried to establish, some people
were more central than others, and one can get a good idea of religious
conservatives’ views by looking at the statements of some of the most
central figures. 
There seems to be one theme central to religious conservatives’
opinions about Sudan: stay tough on Khartoum. “The United States
needs a strong non-military policy to stop the genocide in Sudan – a
policy to keep the pressure on Khartoum by publicizing Sudan’s atroc-
ities and isolating the regime until the carnage, slavery, rape and delib-
erate mass starvation stop,” the policy declaration on the Sudan
Campaign’s web page read in 2000.214 One may argue that isolate Khar-
toum was exactly what the Clinton administration did. But according
to the campaign, the failure was in that Clinton implemented this pol-
icy “half-heartedly”: “U.S. foreign policy towards the government of
Sudan must be pursued with unwavering firmness and promoted as a
policy priority,” was the central campaign message.215 The same mes-
sage is evident when one looks at the recommendations given at a hear-
ing on U.S. Sudan policy in Congress in the spring of 2001, called
“America’s Sudan Policy: A New Direction?” This hearing is a fitting
illustration of policy views, since it was held just as the Bush adminis-
tration was reviewing its Sudan policy, and was the only official outlet
of opinion from civil society to the legislature. Campaigners like Pro-
fessor Eric Reeves, Roger Winter of the U.S. Committee for Refugees
and the Reverend Gary Kusonoki were all active in the Sudan cam-
paign, and they all presented the same message: in the words of
Kusonoki, “we should treat Sudan as a pariah nation, just as we treated
South Africa years ago.”216
214 Sudan Campaign, “About the Sudan Campaign”.
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To be fair, religious conservatives made more detailed and nuanced
policy proposals as well. Elliot Abrams, who was to become responsible
for Sudan at the National Security Council in the Bush administration,
made three policy recommendations in his article “What to Do About
Sudan?” in The Weekly Standard just weeks before his appointment: first
of all, appoint a special envoy with full access to the President: secondly,
conduct the new diplomatic offensive through the existing Intergovern-
mental Authority on Development (IGAD); and thirdly, consider se-
vere sanctions against Khartoum if the regime does not respond to the
carrots of peace negotiations.217 These recommendations seem to have
been supported by most campaigners. But the bottom line, both for
Abrams and most other campaigners, seems to have been a deep distrust
of the Islamist government in Khartoum. As Nina Shea stated back in
the late 90s: “Negotiations with the genocidal dictatorship (…) will not
achieve either justice or a lasting peace.”218
Yet negotiations were exactly what the Bush administration at-
tempted. Instead of staying tough, the Bush administration decided to
stay in touch with Khartoum. U.S. policy objectives were summed up
in several speeches and hearing statements by Walter Kansteiner, Assis-
tant Secretary for African Affairs at the State Department.219 The objec-
tives were threefold: first of all, a negotiated peace settlement between
the North and South; secondly, cooperation against terrorism from the
government in Khartoum; and thirdly, supplying humanitarian assis-
tance to all those in need in Sudan. This meant involving Khartoum in
talks on all three issues. 
To religious conservatives, Kansteiner represented “the voice of ca-
pitulation” on Sudan. Activist Eric Reeves wrote op-eds on Kansteiner’s
“shallow and ineffectual” leadership in the State Department, which he
called the “deepest shame for the Africa Bureau.”220 Nevertheless, it was
this “voice of capitulation” that won through in the administration,
against the more hard-line approach of Elliot Abrams in the National
Security Council or Roger Winter and Andrew Natsios in U.S. AID.
Special envoy John Danforth summarizes the contrast between the pol-
icy input of religious conservatives and the administration’s policy in
clear terms in his autobiography: “My understanding of the mission
217 Abrams, “What to do about Sudan”.
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President Bush gave me differed from the expectations of concerned
American Christians.” Danforth describes how religious conservatives,
especially in Congress, emphasized how the government in Khartoum
was the oppressor and the Southern Sudanese the victims. He concludes:
“I did not doubt this observation, but I did not think it relevant to my
mission. As I understood it, President Bush had asked me to see if
America could be a peacemaker. He did not ask me to be the moral ar-
biter between the two sides.”221 
Religious conservatives got things their way on some issues. They
pressured hard to get a special envoy, and to get John Danforth instead
of Chester Crocker. They pressured hard to get direct aid supplies to
Southern Sudan without Khartoum’s restrictions, and this became the
third policy priority of the administration.222 And the issue of slavery,
one of the initial concerns of the activists, was made one of the four tests
special envoy Danforth presented to assess Khartoum’s seriousness in the
negotiations: indeed, an international commission was set up to look
into the allegations of slavery.223 But the administration’s overarching
policy move remained offering Khartoum carrots like international rec-
ognition and an end to UN sanctions in return for peace negotiations and
cooperation on terror. This was against the will of most religious conser-
vatives. Activists admit they wanted the administration to be much
more aggressive towards Khartoum. “But there are probably a million
different ways to go about doing something. The administration’s ap-
proach worked,” one says.224 Secular observer David Smock is categorical
in his assessment of the religious conservatives’ policy inputs: “Evangel-
icals were not helpful in creating policy proposals.”225 
What then, explains the administration’s approach? One obvious
candidate is 9/11. The terror attacks on the U.S. occurred five days after
John Danforth was appointed special envoy. Khartoum was quick to of-
fer full cooperation on terrorism in the following days, and provided
lists and information on terror suspects. “The attacks of 9/11 may not
have changed everything, but they did scare Sudan’s government into
seeking improved relations with Washington. Suddenly, Bashir [the
leader in Khartoum] started to be helpful on terrorism and also to ne-
gotiate productively, albeit unhurriedly, with Garang [the rebel lead-
er],” Madeleine Albright states in her memoirs from the period.226
Albright believes she did everything she could to end the war in Sudan.
In her view, it was 9/11 – not the new administration – that changed
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the picture.227 Cooperation on terrorism was well underway under the
Clinton administration before 9/11 as well.228 But such cooperation was
given a much higher priority after the terror attack, both by Khartoum
and Washington D.C. “9/11 injected a degree of urgency into our
counter-terrorism cooperation with Khartoum. (…) I can with confi-
dence characterize their current cooperation as acceptable,” Walter
Kansteiner III told Congress in the summer of 2002.229 
For John Danforth, it was a goal not to make “moral proclamations”
against Khartoum. Danforth says he promised the Sudanese foreign
minister “normal relations” between Sudan and the United States on
the personal behalf of President Bush. “I am convinced that the response
of President Bush was a critical factor in persuading the government of
Sudan to make the concessions that led to the peace agreement signed
by the parties in January 2005,” Danforth concludes.230 Several factors
contributed to that agreement, and not all of them can be attributed to
the United States. But according to several observers, the peace deal
would never have been struck if the United States had not brought such
leverage to the process.231 It is also worth noting that several of the pol-
icy proposals the U.S. brought into the process had been tabled by the
working groups at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) and the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Most important of these was
the one-state solution that was to be the central element of the agree-
ment. “I do hope we were helpful,” David Smock says, and adds that the
negotiating parties told him that some of his institute’s ideas were gen-
erated into peace process.232 Michael Horowitz scornfully dismissed the
work of CSIS as “appeasement” and labeled the think thank “the con-
structive engagement crowd”.233 Although meant as an insult, con-
structive engagement with Khartoum proved to be crucial in ending
the world’s longest civil war.
Legislative policies
Even though foreign policy is primarily a presidential prerogative, the
bulk of the campaigning on Sudan was directed at Congress. “We
worked very hard, and visited the Hill again and again,” Richard Cizik
of the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) explains when asked
227 Ibid., p. 255.
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to describe the key to the success of the Sudan campaign.234 But why
Capitol Hill, and not the White House? “Because unless you can put a
bill on the President’s desk, you’re dependent on the President’s
whims,” Cizik answered.
As noted earlier, law-making is one of the ways Congress may in-
fluence foreign policy, and the bill Cizik is talking about here is The
Sudan Peace Act.235 The bill was the baby of the religious conservative
campaign; in fact Michael Horowitz at Hudson claims he drafted the
entire bill himself.236 It was crafted as a reaction to the oil boom in
Sudan in the late 1990s, which gave the regime in Khartoum new
resources to wage war on the South. The idea behind the law was to put
more pressure on Khartoum, and among the provisions were capital
market sanctions to keep companies that invested in Sudan (like
Australian Talisman Oil and Swedish Lundin Oil) out of American cap-
ital markets. The sanctions were first presented in 1999 by a coalition
of religious conservatives and national security hawks who wanted to
put extra pressure on Khartoum for counter-terrorism reasons.237 Later,
the semi-official Commission on International Religious Freedom and
Elliot Abrams picked up on the idea, before Congressman Spencer
Bachus (a Republican from Alabama) included it as the “Bachus
amendment” to the proposed Sudan Peace Act in the spring of 2001.
After 9/11 the amendment was fiercely contested both by the Bush ad-
ministration and leading senators who wanted to improve relations
with Khartoum. In the end, the administration pressed Congress to sus-
pend the entire bill and help lift UN sanctions on Sudan as a reward for
the cooperation on terrorism instead.238
It was not until October 21, 2002 that a final Sudan Peace Act was
signed into law by President Bush. This act had been toned down con-
siderably since the first draft, but still provided new means to maintain
pressure on Khartoum in the ongoing peace negotiations: the President
was asked to report after six months whether Khartoum was negotiat-
ing in “good faith” or interfering unreasonably with humanitarian as-
sistance efforts.239 If Khartoum was found to be obstructing the
negotiations, a number of sanctions would be imposed, including deny-
ing access to loans from the World Bank and IMF and a UN embargo
on the Sudanese government.
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“I will not forget Sudan,” President Bush promised when he signed
the Sudan Peace Act into law. And in what Allen Hertzke considers an
acknowledgement of the power of the faith-based campaign movement,
Bush added: “And if I do, I know that you will prod me.”240 At the same
time, in the official press release issued by the White House, the Presi-
dent underlines that foreign policy is his domain, no matter what a bill
from Congress states: “The executive branch shall construe these provi-
sions as advisory because such provisions, if construed as mandatory,
would impermissibly interfere with the President’s exercise of his con-
stitutional authorities to conduct the Nation’s foreign affairs.”241
So, did the law influence U.S. policy on Sudan? As previously men-
tioned, it is questionable how much influence Congress has on foreign
policy in general. In this case, it is hard to draw a decisive conclusion on
the impact. President Bush did report to Congress about the negotia-
tions in April 2003 as the law required. He certified that Khartoum was
in fact negotiating “in good faith”, even though their forces continued
to attack civilians in spite of a signed cease-fire.242 This provoked a mas-
sive outcry from religious conservatives, but the administration did not
change its assessment no matter how fierce the protests were.243 Never-
theless, Allen Hertzke claims that the “fierce lobbying by Sudan coali-
tion members” with the Sudan Peace Act as their main weapon was vital
to keep the pressure on Khartoum in the final phases of the peace nego-
tiations. Other analysts support this view.244 “Bush was pursuing a con-
structive engagement where Clinton had been containing and isolating.
Bush’s contention was: if you put enough incentives on the table, Khar-
toum would turn. Congress used the Sudan Peace Act as a stick to com-
pensate for Bush’s carrots, and probably the combination of the two was
decisive,” Colin Thomas-Jensen concludes.245
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 Conclusion
Attention, not substance
“You never know if you influence someone, or if he just agrees with
you,” Richard Land of the Southern Baptist Convention replied when
asked about the evangelical influence on President Bush’s policy to-
wards Sudan.246 Though measuring influence has its intrinsic difficul-
ties, some scholars do not shy away from making clear-cut conclusions:
“The faith-based movement has bent the arc of Sudanese history,” Allen
Hertzke emphatically claims in his account of the religious conservative
campaigning for persecuted Christians in Sudan.247 His claim is some-
what hyperbolic. Had the Bush administration followed the advice of
the faith-based movement on how to conduct peace negotiations in
Sudan (stay tough on Khartoum), there may never have been a peace
agreement. On the other hand, if the well-connected faith-based move-
ment had not lobbied so consistently, the Bush administration would
probably not have become heavily involved in peace-making in Sudan
in the first place. Even though personal convictions probably played an
important role, there seems to be a strong case for religiously conserva-
tive influence being the primary explanation for the Bush administra-
tion’s policy attention. The case is weaker in terms of policy substance,
even though the Sudan Peace Act may have been an important compo-
nent in the U.S. efforts for peace. Thus, Walter Russell Mead is proba-
bly right when he claims that “thanks to evangelical pressure, (…) the
[United States] has led the fight to end Sudan’s wars.”248 Evangelical
pressure explains why the United States got involved in Sudan, but it
does not explain why the administration fought the way it did once in-
volved. 
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Theoretical conclusions
The shape of Christian-conservative involvement in foreign affairs
seems largely to be consistent with the influential involvement of eth-
nic lobbies in the past: the group retained strong ties to the country lob-
bied for through missionary groups and Sudanese exiles. The campaign
for Sudan was backed by a broad public, though not by everyone, by vir-
tue of evangelical constituencies, and as Walter Russell Mead notes,
“the projection of religious faith and values onto the arena of foreign
policy has tremendous appeal and resonance for tens of millions of
Americans”.249 Furthermore, the campaign had plenty of members and
other resources; and the plight of Sudanese Christians was widely con-
sidered a legitimate interest, even though secular human rights groups
accused the faith-based groups of “special pleading” for Christians. 
Concerning the pressure directed at Congress, we have seen exam-
ples of direct constituency pressure in the case of the state of Colorado;
the importance of personal access to decision-makers through the work
of, for instance, Bill Frist; and an ability to draw “strange bedfellows”
into the coalition in the case of Jewish and Catholic groups, plus Afri-
can-Americans. There was, however, competition from groups with
conflicting views: potentially in the case of oil, and from an active lobby
on gum Arabic. But the gum Arabic lobby’s significance seemed to have
faded in importance, and it is far from obvious that oil interests were a
barrier to involvement in the peace process. Finally, although we have
seen plenty of examples of direct lobbying of the executive through per-
sonal contacts with President Bush, the bulk of lobbying seems to have
been directed towards the legislature. Therefore, the criterion of the
ability to lobby the executive directly is only partially met. 
The term “Wilsonian revival” has been used to describe the increas-
ing influence of evangelicals on foreign-affairs issues.250 “Wilsonian” is
a way to describe those who emphatically believe there is a vital linkage
between American security and the pursuit of American values of free-
dom abroad. Judging from the description of the faith-based campaign
for Sudan presented here, religious conservatives share this idealistic
agenda. There is one major difference, however. Whereas the traditional
Wilsonians addressed questions of values primarily in secular terms like
freedom and human rights, the “born-again Wilsonians” have an ex-
plicitly religious agenda of religious freedom and religious rights.251 
Although Wilsonian revival may be a fitting description of the
Christian-conservative lobby movement, U.S. policy substance in this
case has looked more like Hamiltonianism. Hamiltonians constitute the
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traditional, realist camp in American foreign-policy thinking. And tra-
ditional realist interests like cooperation on national security seem to
have been just as important a motivation as a Wilsonian will to trans-
form or even dispose of an authoritarian regime in the case of Sudan. Or,
put differently: the peace process in Sudan is a case where Hamiltonian
(realist) and Wilsonian (idealistic) interests merged. As a representative
of the Bush administration, counterterrorism coordinator Karl Wycoff,
put it before the House International Relations Committee in 2004:
“[A] successful conclusion to the Sudanese peace process will help make
the region more stable and less vulnerable to terrorists and their facili-
tators.”252 Before 9/11, Sudan was not very important in terms of na-
tional security. After 9/11, the most important success criterion
identified in studies of ethnic lobbies was fulfilled: the lobby campaign
pressed for a policy – a peace deal in Sudan – in line with U.S. strategic
interests – counterterrorism. A brief look at three other cases suggests
that evangelical lobby success is less likely when this decisive criterion
is not met. 
Apart from Sudan, the religiously conservative campaign has been
most concerned with persecuted Christians in North Korea and China.
Modeled on the Helsinki Process in which human rights were used as
leverage for regime change in the Soviet Union in the 1970s, the North
Korea Human Rights Act (NKHRA) was initiated by religious conser-
vatives and passed by Congress in 2004. Its first paragraph stated that
“it is the sense of Congress that the human rights of North Koreans
should remain a key element in future negotiations between the United
States, North Korea, and other concerned parties in Northeast Asia.”253
But when the United States, North Korea and the other parties in the
six-party talks signed a “denuclearization action plan” in February
2007, human rights were not mentioned at all in the official State De-
partment release.254 “The State Department is out there to give Kim
Jung Il ‘peace in our time’. Human rights are not on the table at all, and
Helsinki is anathema to the State Department,” Michael Horowitz, the
author of the bill, gloomily commented a few days before the action
plan was signed.255
In the case of North Korea, denuclearization seems so far to have
trumped human rights. In the case of China, economic interests seem to
have been strongest. In 2000, religious conservatives campaigned hard
to prevent the Clinton administration granting China permanent, nor-
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malized trade relations because of China’s persecution of Christians and
other religious minorities. The campaign did not succeed, and China
got its trade relations. However, religious conservatives celebrated it as
a major victory when President Bush demanded to give an uncensored
speech on religious freedom on his state visit to China in 2002.256 But
apart from such largely symbolic gestures, conservative Christians have
not had much success in altering U.S. relations with China. In fact,
when asked why his people had such success swaying Bush on Sudan,
Richard Land of the Southern Baptist Convention simply answered:
“Because Khartoum is not Beijing.” Then, he elaborated: “We can’t in-
tervene everywhere. But we have to intervene where we can make a dif-
ference.”257
In the case of Sudan, evangelicals did make a difference. But even in
Sudan, neither the U.S. government nor American evangelicals can
bend the arc of history alone, even when their interests are aligned. Con-
sider what is happening in Darfur. Fighting between government-sup-
ported troops and rebel groups started in Darfur well before the peace
agreement for Southern Sudan had been signed, and the two conflicts
were obviously connected.258 Nevertheless, in 2003–04, evangelical
mobilization against the mass killings in Darfur was much slower and
more fragmented than it was for Southern Sudan a few years earlier. “I
pray that diminished evangelical action is not due to the fact that Mus-
lims are being slaughtered and not Christians,” Allen D. Hertzke re-
marked in a lecture in November 2004.259 By 2006, however, a massive
grassroots campaign was in action for Darfur as well, dominated by
evangelicals.260 By this time, President Bush had reacted forcefully,
pushing for UN forces on the ground and sanctions on Khartoum. But
the conflict remained unresolved as of December 2007. The main rea-
son: the regime in Khartoum, which the U.S. stayed in touch with to
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secure a peace deal in the south, had now decided to stay tough in return
and hinder international involvement in the conflict.261 
The future of evangelical foreign policy
U.S. policies towards North Korea, China, and even Darfur, are obvious
cases for further research to test Walter Russell Mead’s claim that “the
recent surge in the number and the power of evangelicals is recasting
the country’s political scene – with dramatic implications for foreign
policy”.262 The case of Southern Sudan indicates that there is some truth
to his claim, although the revival of the Wilsonian camp may be more
a supplement than a replacement of the Hamiltonian impulses in U.S.
foreign policy. What about the future? Can Mead’s thesis, if not a de-
scription of the present situation, serve as a prediction of future power? 
The evangelical moment may already be over in U.S. foreign policy.
An initial indication of this is that religious conservatives think so
themselves. In the interview in February 2007, Michael Horowitz ex-
pressed concern over what he had seen in the evangelical community
over the last year or two. Mainly because of a lack of recognition of their
efforts in the national press, he said, there had been “a decline in priority
and attention given to foreign-policy issues. Some Christians are revert-
ing back to the default options of abortion and gay marriage. Others are
going into the politically correct issue of global warming.”263 In a
roundtable on Mead’s Foreign Affairs essay in the journal Faith & Inter-
national Affairs, managing editor of the leading evangelical newspaper
Christianity Today, Mark Galli, expressed similar concerns. He claimed
that evangelicals are only interested in “specific problems that affect
specific people in specific ways.”264 Therefore, Galli predicted that evan-
gelicals will become less interested in foreign policy when they discover
how complex it is. According to Galli, Mead is too generous in his de-
scription of the role of evangelicals: “Both our history and our DNA
suggest that these optimistic assessments will not bear up. (…) We will
continue to have flashes of international genius – like abolition and re-
ligious freedom – but in all, our unique contribution to the world lies
elsewhere.”265 
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A second argument against future evangelical influence on foreign
policy is demographic. Although still the most religious of the world’s
industrialized countries, even Americans are becoming less religious.
Overall religious participation has declined significantly since its peak
in the 1960s.266 And though this general decline has affected traditional
denominations the hardest, evangelical churches are affected too:
“Evangelicals fear the loss of their teenagers,” the headline of a New York
Times article read in October 2006. The article cited statistics predict-
ing that only 4 percent of teenagers today will be “Bible-believing
adults” later in life, a sharp decline from 35 percent in the baby-boomer
generation and 65 percent of the World War II generation. The statis-
tics prompted the National Association of Evangelicals into adopting a
resolution deploring “the epidemic of young people leaving the evan-
gelical church.”267 
Finally, although evangelicals were considered to have some influ-
ence on the Reagan administration, the current influence of evangelicals
seems closely connected to Bush’s personal faith and the composition
and electoral basis of the Bush administration.268 Their influence on fu-
ture administrations is uncertain. Although some republicans claim the
Grand Old Party has become God’s Own Party, the frontrunner in the
upcoming presidential election (as of November 2007), Rudy Giuliani,
has few if any ties to the evangelical community.269 David Smock of the
U.S. Institute of Peace contended that evangelicals were not a strong
force in the 2006 midterm elections, that a possible Democrat admin-
istration would feel “much less beholden” to them, and finally that
evangelicals “will have much less influence on future administrations.”
Nevertheless, it would be premature to write off evangelical influ-
ence on U.S. foreign policy altogether. The Christian Right has been
written off before, when the Moral Majority dissolved in the late 1980s
or when the Christian Coalition’s influence waned in the mid-90s.
Richard Cizik of the National Association of Evangelicals does not share
Michael Horowitz or Mark Galli’s gloomy predictions of evangelical
foreign-policy activism. “What we are witnessing, is the rise of a new,
centrist evangelicalism. An activist and internationalist foreign policy
266 Putnam, Bowling Alone, pp. 70–72.
267 Laurie Goodstein, “Evangelicals Fear the Loss of Their Teenagers,” New York Times, 10
October 2006.
268 Smith, Faith and the Presidency.
269 Chris Hedges even uses the word fascist to describe the Christian right: Chris
Hedges, American Fascists. The Christian Right and the War on America (New York: Free
Press, 2006). Republican Kevin Phillips settles with “God’s Own Party”: Kevin Phil-
lips, “How the GOP Became God’s Own Party”, op-ed, Washington Post, 2 April
2006. Esther Kaplan claims that the Christian right believes they have God on their
side: Esther Kaplan, With God on their Side (New York: New Press, 2004). As for
Giuliani, he has, as have all GOP presidential candidates, tried to befriend evangeli-
cals as much as he can. See Adele M. Stan, “Giuliani, Gays and Values Voters”, Amer-
ican Prospect, 10 October 2007.
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that cares about pursuing a role that is not arrogant,” Cizik says.270
Cizik is one of the evangelicals pushing what Michael Horowitz called
“the politically correct” issue of climate change the hardest within the
evangelical community, and predicts that evangelicals will play a piv-
otal role in turning official U.S. climate policies in the future.271 Policy
analyst John Green at Pew Forum agrees with Cizik’s thesis of a more
centrist evangelicalism, and predicted that the next generation of evan-
gelicals will be more diverse in their policy opinions than today’s Chris-
tian Right. According to him, “foreign policy concerns are here to stay
for evangelicals.”272 
One should probably be more nuanced when interpreting the sec-
ond argument against an evangelical foreign-policy future. Although
belief patterns may be changing, the picture is not entirely clear.
“Young people have always been less engaged. They tend to return to
church when they grow older, marry and settle down. And this return
is higher among evangelicals than mainstream Christians,” John Green
points out.273 And a 2006-survey from Pew Forum indicates that Amer-
icans in general remain more supportive of religion’s role in public life
today than they did in the 1960s.274 
Finally, although a future presidential administration may not be as
receptive to evangelicals as the Bush administration has been, it would
also be premature to write off evangelicals’ role in electoral politics. Exit
polls from the 2006 elections show that so-called “value issues” were
considered among the most important for voters in these elections as
well, as they were in 2004.275 And the religious divide between Repub-
lican and Democratic voters, the so-called “God Gap”, persisted: white
evangelicals and those who attend church frequently continued to sup-
port Republicans by large margins and remained the party’s most loyal
voters.276 This means a future Republican president will have to take
evangelicals into account. And should a Democrat reach the White
House in 2008 or later, the self-proclaimed evangelical center is ready
to influence him or her. Richard Cizik tells how he had approached both
Democratic presidential frontrunners Hillary Clinton and Barack
270 Cizik, personal interview with author.
271  Among Cizik’s achievements is the Evangelical Climate Initiative, signed by around 80
evangelical leaders in January 2006 [online 13 Dec 2007]. On the other hand, around
25 leading evangelical leaders in March 2007 called for Cizik to resign for being to
activist on climate change issues. See Adelle M. Banks, “Dobson, Others Seek Ouster
of NAE Vice President”, Christianity Today, web edition, 2 March 2007 [online 8 Mar
2007].
272  Green, personal interview.
273  Ibid.
274  Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, American Views on Religion, Politics, and Public
Policy, report (August 2006).
275  “Exit Polls”, America Votes 2006 (CNN [online 6 Mar 2007]).
276  Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, “Religion and the 2006 Elections”, Surveys
[online 6 Mar 2007].
Obama almost a year before the Democratic primaries to discuss reli-
gious persecution and other foreign-policy issues with them.277 And all
frontrunners, Republican and Democrat, have courted evangelical vot-
ers extensively throughout the run-up to the 2008 primaries.278 Al-
though their future influence might be uncertain, it seems certain that
evangelicals have come to stay as a source of influence on the foreign
policy of the United States.
277  Cizik, personal interview.
278  Claire Brinberg, “Democratic candidates trying to reach religious voters”, CNN.com/
politics, 22 July 2007 (CNN [26 Nov 2007]); Paul Steinhauser and Xuan Thai,
“Romney wins straw poll at Values Voters Summit”, CNN.com, October 20, 2007.
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